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Abstract 
Federalism is a political set of principles of action and institution whose purpose is to 
accommodate unity with diversity without destroying one or the other, and it is not a 
surprise if social scientists can find in federations – as in Empires - a lot of empirical 
evidence on monetary plurality and complementarity. This paper addresses the issue of 
monetary federalism, considering that it is a figure of complementarity among monies 
caused by locality. The proposed analysis is based on the hypothesis of institutional 
complementarity which assumes that the principles of organization of a monetary system 
have to fit, in a way or another, with those of the political organization of the society within 
which the monetary system functions as a community of account (of debts) and a set of 
means of payments (of these debts). The first section starts by a developpement of the 
theoretical idea that with such a definition, money has intrinsically a federal structure 
combining unicity (of the unit of account) and plurality-diversity (of the means of 
payment). Then it comes to the fact that this intrinsic federal structure of modern money 
does not appear clearly in the monetary institutions of most of the existing federations, 
including Argentina where monetary plurality has always been outstanding. We explain 
this paradox in term of political repression of monetary federalism. The following sections 
are devoted to an examination of the practical monetary federalism existing in Argentina 
from 1984 to 2003. A second section tackles the question of why Argentina exhibits a 
noteworthy case of monetary federalism, even if it is a repressed one, and describes the 
different waves of issuances of provincial fiscal monies since the foundation of the federal 
Republic. A third section focuses on the complementary fiscal money issued by the 
Province of Tucuman between 1985 and 2003 ; it examines why it was issued, and how it 
functionned at its outset and evolved. Section 4 at last examines if the bocade was an 
efficient device, given the political and economic environment in which its life developped 
untill its terminal redeeming by the federal State. 
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The present crisis of the euro, as an outcome of a single monetary policy for a diversity of 
economically and culturally heterogenous territories, is an incentive for a deep rethinking of 
the conception of this monetary policy and its theoretical underpinnings.  Most of monetary 
experiments in general, but especially in political contexts of federal polities, indicate that we 
should better think of money not as unique but plural, or better said, as simultaneously unique 
and plural, and not assimilate plurality only with competition between monies, but also 
consider complementarity among them (Kuroda, 2008).  
Federalism is a political set of principles of action and institution whose purpose is 
precisely to accommodate unity with diversity without sacrificing one or the other, and it is 
not a surprise if, despite the fact that a non pluralist view on money also prevails in federalist 
polities, social scientists can find there a lot of empirical evidence about monetary plurality 
and complementarity. In mainstream economics and political science governed by the rational 
choice theory, federalism is conceived as a « market-preserving » device, and no attention is 
payed to other principles of human action than competition (see the works of Barry Weingast 
and collaborators). But this view has been disputed since the model does not fit with 
empirical evidence of many federations whose purpose is firstly « peace-keeping », and which 
are based on cooperation and complementarity more than economic competition  (think of the 
principle of subsidiarity) between layers of government of different territorial scales. In these 
federations driven more by politics than economics, we can observe more easily than 
anywhere else1 cases of what can be named « monetary federalism ». In relation with the 
European Union and the Eurozone crisis, it is of interest to study these cases since they design 
a way of preserving the euro as a common unit of account without depriving member States 
of issuing complementary fiscal money circulating within States’ boarders and maintained at 
par with the euro.  
Recent East Asian monetary history has shown us that there is no natural linear evolution 
of money from metal toward a purely abstract and dematerialized media of exchange. 
Therefore an important part of the hypotheses founding the European-American mainstream 
monetary theory appears as nothing but a tale, and then we have to reconsider our reading of 
the history of money in Europe and America as an inexorable march towards a universal 
abstract and unique money. Moreover we have to look at federal monetary experiments which 
have been forgotten because they were not successful in producing stable and permanent 
institutions, but are part of these « buried knowledges » that, with Michel Foucault, we must 
                                               
1
 Without doubt we have to except here the cases of Empires that could be tentatively defined as federations 
founded not on  mutual consent but on domination backed by military force. In Empires, monetary plurality is 
prevalent, and unitary States, even when decentralized, were built partly on the idea of reducing to unicity such a 
plurality (see Helleiner, 2003).  
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consider as a crucial material of the scientific knowledge. For the failure of many of them was 
not the outcome of natural selection due to their economic inefficiency, but of political 
defeats of the social forces that were promoting them at some historical moments. Indeed we 
have to consider these experiments not only for the beauty of scientific work aiming at 
historical truth, but also as genuine and original elements of knowledge important for the 
design of new political and monetary institutional arrangements of federal type in a more 
globalized world. Let’s remember that during a very long time, before becoming the standard 
form of money, purely fiat money has been in the West considered by economists and 
politicians as a purely emergency money, and then discredited as a counterfeited, not true 
money.  
In this perspective, this paper addresses the issue of monetary federalism. It considers that 
it is a figure of complementarity among monies caused by locality. It is based on the idea of 
institutional complementarity which assumes that the principles of organization of a monetary 
system have to fit, in a way or another, with those of the political organization of the society 
within which the monetary system functions as a community of account (of debts) and a set of 
means of payments (of these debts). The first section starts by a developpement of the 
theoretical idea that with such a definition, money has intrinsically a federal structure 
combining unicity (of the unit of account) and plurality-diversity (of the means of payment). 
Then it comes to the fact that this intrinsic federal structure of modern money does not appear 
clearly in the monetary institutions of most of the existing federations, including Argentina 
where monetary plurality has always been outstanding. This paradox is explained in term of 
political repression of monetary federalism. The following sections are devoted to an 
examination of the practical monetary federalism existing in Argentina from 1984 to 2003. A 
second section tackles the question of why Argentina exhibits a noteworthy case of monetary 
federalism, even if it is a repressed one, and describes the different waves of issuances of 
provincial fiscal monies since the foundation of the federal Republic. A third section focuses 
on the complementary fiscal money issued by the Province of Tucuman between 1985 and 
2003 ; it examines why it was issued, and how it functionned at its outset and evolved. 
Section 4 at last examines if the bocade was an efficient device, given the political and 
economic environment in which its life developped untill its terminal redeeming by the 
federal State. 
 
1. Political federalism, monetary federalism 
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1.1. Some general principles 
 
Federalism can be defined as a way to shape a political order on the basis of a hierarchy of 
values and not, as usual in a unitary State, on a hierarchy of powers (with concentration of all 
the power at the top). The federal layer of government is not greater in power than the 
federated governments, for it does not have the monopoly of political competencies : in the 
domains where they are sovereign, federated entities are superior in power to the federal 
government. But the latter is in charge of competencies which are greater in value because 
they found the federation as a whole, for instance by insuring internal peace between member 
States, and acting for them as their deputy in the external world. Therefore in a federal polity, 
there is an overlapping hierarchy of powers and no sovereign power in the strict meaning of 
the word2. Sovereignty in this sense is the attribute of an authority separated from any 
executive power, and whose decisions are enforcable only if federal and federated powers 
recognize it as a sovereign authority to whom they submit themselves; if not, the federation is 
on the way toward dissolution. This authority, whose power is purely symbolical, is a third 
party placed in position of sovereignty above any political power either federal or federated. It 
usually takes the material and institutional forms of a special judicial power – the Supreme or 
Constitutional Court – which has the necessary authority to settle on the conflicts of powers 
between or within the two (or more) layers of governments making up a federative political 
order. 
Now this general structure of federalism makes sense for the monetary order of the modern 
state-and-market societies where economy is differentiated from the political, the religious 
and the domestic orders. Decreeing the system and unit of account, maintaining its 
uniqueness, are competencies of the federal layer ; as stated notably by Hawtrey or Keynes 
they are of greater value than the powers to issue and circulate means of payments. These 
latter powers can be shared, decentralized and even decentered ; in order to allow basic 
transactions, they are usually distributed to different agents and organisations acting at 
different territorial scales and with different purposes. Monies of payment circulate in 
multiple spheres of transactions and users’ networks (public or private, market or non market, 
small or large, local, regional or national) ; they take different material forms, are not a priori 
« all purpose money », and most often have to be « marked » to be accepted in transactions 
(see the works of Viviana Zelizer and Jérôme Blanc). For them to form a payment community 
despite the fact they cannot be unified, they must be federated, which allow them to circulate 
                                               
2
 On the practical emergence and then theorization of this conception of divided sovereignty in the British 
American colonies and then the US at the end of the 18th century, see Lacroix, 2010. 
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in more extended and impersonal networks and across a priori heterogenous transactions’ 
spheres by the mediation of a common federal unit of account.  
Therefore in a society symbolized by a common system and unit of account,  the power to 
issue moneys of payment can be distributed functionally and territorially among different 
issuers (banks, private companies, States, Cities, LETS, Associations, etc.) without 
necessarily being a danger for the unity and cohesion of the society ; rather the competence of 
issuing instruments of settling debts appears structurally to pertain to the domain of 
decentralized or federated powers. But for unification to be effective without centralization, 
the various means of payment created have to be denominated in a common unit of account 
(or at least convertible at a stable value) and the parity between units of payment and the unit 
of account has to be maintained.  
 As for the third party that would represent the federative sovereign monetary authority, it 
can be neither the federal power to decree and maintain the unit and the system of account, 
nor the federated powers to issue means of payment. History shows that the true sovereign in 
monetary matters is the People of the users of money who decides the future of any money, 
imaginary or real, in accepting or refusing of using it in its internal multilateral transactions. 
Now this People can be thought of as deciding, through a monetary Constitution, to delegate 
its authority by recognizing to an institution independant from the monetary powers (public 
and private) the competence of interpreting the monetary Constitution in order to settle on 
conflicts between issuers of currencies, and to maintain the commonality of the system and 
unit of account.  
In this perspective, such a monetary authority should not be confused with the Central 
Bank which is not independant from issuers of currencies, and is most often than otherwise 
only a hierarchical police and executive power, that is to say a part and parcel of the federal 
layer of government. Central Banks are powers that have to built their legitimacy, which 
means that they are deprived of the ethical authority residing in the values and social norms 
constituting a population of money users as a social whole. Central Banks need, in order to 
legitimize their monetary policies, an ethical backing in the values sustaining the political 
community, either unitary or federative. Surely, the Federal Reserve Board in the US, in its 
design at least, is the closest institution of such an ideal-typical monetary authority. Its 
presence could explain why in this country, despite the tremendous monetary power of its 
private financial industry, monetary repression of non commercial bank issuances of monies 
is presently one of the weakest in the world.  
But why this intrinsic federal structure of modern money does not appear clearly in the 
monetary institutions of most of the existing federations ? Why complementarities between 
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monetary and political institutions are not actualized or, at least, taken into consideration by 
the social sciences ? Why monetary institutions in federal or quasi-federal polities are 
designed as if Federations were identical to unitary States ? Why the relationships between 
the political organization of a society and the organization of its monetary system are so little 
investigated and taken into account, even when the latter and then the former are falling into a 
deep crisis ? It is not the aim of this paper to answer such questions, answers which would 
involve to examine the strong links existing between standard monetary theories prevailing in 
an historical period, and monetary institutions and policies. Here we just focus on some 
monetary experiments which unveil the effective presence of federalist monetary 
arrangements in some federations, giving what is more some insights for possible 
improvements of institutional coherence between the monetary and the political in the EU.  
Let’s then start the journey to Argentina. 
 
1.2. Emergency monies or repressed monetary federalism 
 
In the monetary history of Argentina, the importance taken in several periods by provincial 
states’ issuance of « quasi-monies » (Bordo and Veigh, 1998) under the form of tax 
anticipation scrips, bills or warrants (Fisher, 1933 ; Gatch, 2011) has been under-investigated. 
The situation is nearly similar for the monetary history of the United States and other federal 
countries. Nonetheless Argentina is to some extent specific since the emergence of such 
quasi-monies has been recurrent untill the very present3. 
The apparition in Argentina of provincial fiscal paper monies in the form of tax 
anticipation scrips (generally entittled letras de cancelacion de obligaciones, titulo publico al 
portador or bonos de cancelacion de deudas) is noticed by economists only in times of strong 
social stresses and political crises ; most of the time these quasi-monies are considered 
exclusively as emergency monies. But this supposed emergency character might well be 
nothing but the expression of a rhetorical effect associated to a peculiar conception of what is 
a « normal » state of monetary order, a normality which is no other thing that normativity, and 
implies that the national or federal State (or an independant central monetary power) has to be 
fully sovereign in public monetary matters, even if the polity is officially organized in 
accordance with federalist principles (Helleiner, 2003). So provincial States’ monies appear 
most of the time visible to official actors only in periods of emergency, and as soon as crises 
are overcome, they are outlawed or forgotten since they are not thought to pertain to a 
                                               
3
 Some US federated States as California still regularly use IOUs in order to finance their unbalanced budget, but 
as far as I know, these IOUs do not seem to circulate as paper money of small denomination as it has been the 
case in Argentina. Indeed it is also an issue that is not much investigated. 
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« normal » modern monetary order; when they appear to be macroeconomically significant 
they are eliminated or redeemed by the central power in search of a « return to normality ».  
Thus the empirical evidence that they have been and therefore could be successful – under 
certain conditions - in addressing the issues of balancing public finance and promoting local 
economic development is not taken into account and integrated into mainstream monetary 
theory. Consequently, as stated by Loren Gatch on the subject of U.S. municipal tax 
anticipations scrips in the 1930s : 
« for a local tax-based currency to function in noncrisis conditions as a normal feature of local government 
finance and local economic activity would require a widespread and public re-thinking of monetary legitimacy » 
(Gatch, 2011, p.22).  
 
It is worth quoting at length this author, since what he writes about the municipal monies 
in the United States is worth also for the provincial monies of Argentina : 
« if the money-sovereignty nexus is constitutive of “monetary space”, then the implied lessons of the 
historical experience with tax anticipation scrip will come from answers to political questions about the 
powers and autonomy of local governments, and not to economic questions about the putative benefits of 
local currencies. (…)  As one legal authority wrote about tax anticipation scrip, “it is somewhat surprising that 
the Federal administration has not taken cognizance of this desultory infiltration of illegitimate paper money into 
the channels of monetary circulation” (Nussbaum 1937, 1083). Far from taking “cognizance” of this “desultory 
infiltration”, the federal government ignored the use of tax anticipation scrip, and these experiments in local 
currency quickly faded from public consciousness. For us to take cognizance of the significance of local 
currency, and to revive public consciousness of its potential in our present day, requires us to appreciate those 
historical moments when local currency, despite its success, disappeared as an expression of local power. » 
(Gatch, 2011, pp. 25-26 ; our emphasizing) 4. 
 
Grubb (2003, 2005, 2011), following Lester (1939), Ferguson (1956, 1986), Smith (1986), 
Schweitzer (1989), draws similar conclusions in his works on fiscal monies of the North 
American Colonies and then States in the « Articles of Confederation ». It is not because 
monetary systems backed by public taxing powers are economically inefficient that they are 
recurrently outlawed ; it is because their supporters have been regularly defeated in the 
political arena by coalitions between (and sometimes merging of) private financial interests 
and politically dominant ruling classes (Holton, 2005)5. In fact, economic arguments 
                                               
4
 « What are the responsibilities and proper scope of local governments? How are these to be ascertained and 
asserted against the powers and pretentions of the central state? Seventy years ago, these questions were 
answered to the detriment of local power. Policy responses to the Great Depression in the United States (and 
elsewhere) had the cumulative effect of drawing power away from local communities to the states, and from 
states to the central government. (…) From the broader perspective of American monetary history, the 
proliferation of local currencies during the 1930s appears as an anomalous development in the progressive 
centralization of monetary power and authority in Washington D.C. » (ibid.) 
5
 « Although until recently historians describing the economic origins of the United States Constitution tended to 
focus on private debt, today more and more scholars contend that the Constitution was also rooted in a struggle 
between taxpayers and investors in government bonds. Between the Yorktown victory of 1781 and the federal 
assumption of state debts in 1790, Americans were hit with taxes that averaged three or four times those of the 
colonial era. The principal purpose of the levies was to pay interest on state and federal government securities, 
many of them bought up by speculators. In the mid-1780s, most states earmarked at least two thirds of their tax 
revenue for foreign and domestic holders of the war bonds. The tax burden was magnified by a shortage of 
circulating coin. (…) The currency shortage also magnified the burden of private debt. (…) Thus what was true 
of taxation was also true of the money supply: in perhaps the two most important areas of peacetime 
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legitimizing the political devaluation of tax backed monies in favour of private fractional 
reserve credit money issued by commercial banks are, as stated by Richard Lester, nothing 
more than « economic theology ». And Lester was prophetic when he concluded in 1939 his 
book « Monetary Experiments » by the following words: 
 « Above all we need today some of the intelligent skepticism toward the financial dogma of the day that our 
colonial forefathers had. They did not hesitate to challenge the existing economic theology or to engage in 
intelligent experimentation. The spirit and attitude of our forefathers is in the American tradition. Today too 
many people know what can’t be done and too many economists know the lessons of history that history itself 
fails to record » (Lester, 1939-1970, p. 307). 
 
Indeed economic theology is not limited to United-States, it is also reigning in Europe6 and 
in Argentina as well. An unofficial internal Report of the Dirección Nacional de Coordinación 
Fiscal con las Provincias (DNCFP) of the Argentinian ministry of economy and finance 
shows that perfectly. This report, probably prepared by academic economists7 and concerned 
by the federal redemption in 2003 of the tax backed bonds issued by 16 provinces in the 
1999-2002,  recognized that :  
« Si bien hay acuerdo en que un país con un sistema monetario sano debiera tener una única moneda 
convertible, las posiciones divergen sobre lo que pasa cuando se introducen monedas adicionales. Hay muchos 
ejemplos históricos y aún el reciente caso argentino, en que las monedas, al tener usos distintos, pueden 
convivir sin mayor dificultad. No obstante, es importante dejar en claro que siempre es óptimo que haya una 
sola autoridad de emisión, en lugar de varias, como ocurrió en la Argentina con las monedas provinciales.  
(…)  Caso contrario, se generan basicamente dos problemas: existencia de externalidades y reduccion de 
la certidumbre monetaria » (DNCFP, 2003, p.10 & p. 25).  
 
Thus this report admits that complementarity between fiscal monies – national and 
provincial – is perfectly viable, since they have distinct spatial spheres of circulation. But it 
also considers that it is not “optimal” since optimality resides in the unicity of the monetary 
power, unicity that would adress successfully the two problems of monetary plurality : 
externalities and uncertainty. This statement is a pure theological argument since empirical 
evidence does not sustain it : at the empirical level it is clear that if provincial monies 
emerged in 2001, or better said expanded as we shall see, it was precisely because the unicity 
of monetary authority had produced strong negative externalities and increased uncertainty to 
the point of destroying confidence and trust in the monetary system, and therefore the 
credibility of the centralized monetary power. Moreover it can be observed that provincial 
monies had produced positive externalities and reduced uncertainty when they were 
successfully managed, what has been the case in a majority of provinces and for the largest 
amount of money issued (Théret and Zanabria, 2007 and 2009). 
                                                                                                                                               
governmental action, most of the newly independent states adopted harsher policies than the colonial 
governments they had replaced ». (Holton, 2005, pp. 445-446). 
6
 See the Treaties of Maastricht and Lisbon prohibiting European States but also the Union to issue money and 
giving a monopoly on money issuance to commercial banks. 
7
 See Licari, J. M., Calgagno J. C., Oviedo, J. M. y Pellegrini S. (w. d.). 
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In this cognitive context, the case of the Province of Tucuman which issued its money 
under the name of « Bocade » (bonos de cancelacion de deudas, that is to say bonds or bills 
of redemption of debts) during a continuous period of 18 years (1985-2003), is 
overwhelmingly interesting, for it proves :  
- first, that provincial monies are not necessarily of an exclusive emergency nature ; to 
the contrary they may not resist to a situation of crisis of the national money ; 
- second, that provincal tax anticipation bonds do not necessarily compete with national 
money but may be complementary to it ; 
The lasting character of the Bocade first shows that emergency cannot fully explain why 
such a complementary money is issued. At least, if one wants to keep the notion of 
emergency and to carry on looking at provincial monies as ephemeral responses to crises of a 
« normal » state of affairs, it should be considered that the argentinian monetary system does 
not know only periodical medium-term crises (turbulences in a stable system due to external 
shocks), but also embodies long term unresolved contradictions that render it structurally 
instable. Now that would mean that the « standard state » of centralisation and 
commodification of money’s issue is not an optimum, neither a rational nor a reasonable 
satisfactory steady state.  
Moreover, in the case of the « funny » « tucumani Dollar », as Bocade has been ironically 
and with condescension called by the Financial Times (Pilling, 1996), it is possible to assume 
that the 2001 crisis of the convertibility regime, contrary to the cases of late comers in tax 
backed money business as provinces such as Corrientes (Cecacor), Buenos Aires (Patacon), 
and Entre Rios (Federal) (see below), has not given life but death to the tucuman money. And 
that was not a natural death but a political murder, since the federal government and most of 
provincial governments themselves, under the pressure of the IMF, took advantage of the very 
failure of some of them due to overissuing, and of the common sense on the emergency 
character of bonos, to redeem them all together, and to recentralise the whole system in 
Buenos Aires.  
In the convertible Peso’s crisis, the tucuman Bocade did not emerge as an emergency 
money : it was already working continuously since 16 years. So it is more accurate to say that 
the Peso crisis was also a crisis of the Bocade whose usual functioning was disturbed. 
Constrained to become a substitute to a Peso more and more scarce at the national and 
provincial levels, it was overissued and lost a part of the trust put in it, due to growing 
difficulties to insure its convertibility at par in a national legal tender in short supply. But that 
did not imply that the Bocade was condemned to disappear, since it had already been 
confronted to deep crises of the national monetary system (notably hyperinflation), and had 
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successfully gone accross. Moreover if Bocade’s exchange rate in Peso deteriorated on the 
market during the crisis, it nevertheless was maintained under control, as can be seen in figure 
1 where it appears to be a money as good as the lecor, bono of the Province of Cordoba, 
usually considered as a successful experiment8. So the Bocade, even if it has been reducing 
the depressing effects of the Peso crisis on the Tucuman economy, was also finally killed by 
it; but this death was not « natural », i.e. coming from its endogenous functioning. If the bono 
disappeared in 2003, it was because it did not benefited anymore of the benign neglect of the 
central powers and became, with the whole set of bonos, a stake in the negociation between 
the federal Government and the IMF.  
 
Figure 1: Exchange rates in peso of seven provincial monies in 2002-2003 
                                        
Source : Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, 2003, p. 3. 
 
Untill there, the tucuman bono had proved « Difficult to kill », it had  
« resisted to the hyperinflation of Alfonsin, to the convertibility of Menem, to the adjustments of the IMF, to 
the adjustments of the Federal Government, to counterfeiting, to the overissuing of Ortega, Miranda and 
Alperovich, and even to Bussi’s attack who changed a credit without interest from the people into a credit at high 
rates from the banks and the markets9. And finally, it twisted porteños’ arms, since after 16 years of critics 
towards provincial monies, they have had to issue a younger sister of them, the Lecop. » (Cirnigliaro, 2004, p. 
125). « During the 17 years it lived », it had been strongly supported by « the local businessmen (who) 
recognized that the bono allowed them to work quietly » (ibid.).  
 
                                               
8
 Compared to levels of interest rates in the period (16,2% and 39,3% respectively in 2000 and 2001 on 
deposits), discount on exchange rates of 10-15% were still « reasonable ». 
9
 Ramon Ortega (1992-95), Antonio Bussi (1996-1999) and Julio Miranda (2000-2003) were the governors of 
the Province during the currency board period. José Alperovich was the minister of economy of Miranda at the 
moment of the redeeming  of the Bocade by the federal government, and succeeded to him as governor for two 
mandates (2004-2011). 
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Finally, the tucuman case shows that the issue of Bocade in what is a small and poor 
peripheral province10, was caused by structural shortages of national currency and credit 
money, shortages themselves the outcomes of fiscal and monetary federal institutions and 
policies. Thus the provincal money was not competing and driving out of the circulation the 
national legal tender media of payment ; it complemented them within the limits of the 
provincial economic space where it was accepted as a means of redemption of taxes. If a 
surplus in the local economy of national legal tender currency would have been observed, the 
provincial money whose use in transactions was spatially confined, would have returned to 
the provincial treasury and be destroyed or stored in its coffers.  
In fact, though the 1984-2003 period of return to liberal democracy was very unstable at 
the national level from a monetary viewpoint (see figure 2), the Bocade muddled through this 
very volatile period with "success". It had been primarily issued just after the end of the 
« processo » military dictatorship and at the same time as the Austral, the new national money 
created to reduce the very high inflation bequeathed by the military power. But soon after, the 
Austral itself was the prey of hyperinflation and was replaced in 1992 by another money - the 
convertible Peso - issued under a regime of currency board (strict convertibility at par with 
the U.S. Dollar). This time, the new regime did not lead to hyperinflation but to a deep 
recession and finally to a general political and social crisis in 2001, with as a consequence a 
large devaluation of the Peso and a new regime of "pesification" (de-dollarization) at the 
beginning of 2002.  
The resilience of the Bocade at the provincial level, meanwhile there was monetary chaos 
at the national level, is paradoxical ; on one side the Bocade founded its viability and 
efficiency upon a strict convertibility with the national money of the moment, but on the other 
side it was an autonomous device since it had a peripheral character vis-à-vis the central 
monetary system to which it could freely adapt. Its autonomy was therefore an independance 
within interdependance, a good definition perhaps for complementarity. And since 
independance within interdependance is also at the core of the concept of federalism, it 
justifies to tackle the issue of complementarity caused by locality in terms of monetary 
federalism.  
 
Figure 2: A more general context of high inflation and hyperinflation before 
stabilization, and perhaps a come back of high inflation: Argentinian CPI from 1943 to 
2008 (yearly average of monthly indexes, base 100 in 1999)  
 
                                               
10
 In terms of population and GNP, Tucuman is very close to be to Argentina what Greece is to the Eurozone, i.e. 
around 3%.   
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Sources : Vitelli (1986), INDEC and Direccion de estadistica de Tucuman, Gobierno de Tucuman (consulted 
26/01/2012) http://estadistica.tucuman.gov.ar/precios_consumidor.htm 
 
Let’s see that more precisely by recalling first the importance, recurrence, and causes of 
provincial fiscal monies’ issuance in the history of Argentina, and then by focusing on the 
dynamic functioning of the tucuman monetary regime, with both its complementarity and 
relative autonomy vis-à-vis the national monetary regime. Finally we shall try to evaluate the 
efficiency of the device.  
2. The recurrence of issuances of provincial quasi-monies in the history 
of Argentina. 
 
Since the origin of Argentina as an independant country, monetary plurality, tax-based 
money and problems of convertibility of paper-money have marked its history (Grinfeld, 
1910 ; Bordo and Veigh, 1998 ; Irigoin, 2000 and 200311). If we limit us to times when the 
federative Argentinian Republic and the monetary regime of the « Peso moneda nacional » 
                                               
11
 For instance « Despite its turbulent origins and its problematic history, the inconvertible paper money of the 
Province of Buenos Aires has stayed in circulation during fourty years, between 1827 and 1867.  (…) During 
these fourty years, the notes denominated in paper Peso became the dominant medium of payments for 
transactions of the « porteña » domestic economy, and the circulating paper Peso transformed itself in the unit of 
account of import and export prices in the whole region. (…) Reception of paper Pesos in payments of taxes was 
the mecanism conceived by the porteño government to obliging and getting the acceptation of  paper money as a 
circulating medium » (Irigoin, 2003, p. 69).  
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(m$n) were stabilized, i.e. since the end of the 1880s, we can distinguish four waves of 
provincial issuance of money12. 
 
2.1. The four waves of emissions of argentinian provincial monies since 1890 
 
2.1.1. The first « Peso moneda nacional » wave (1890-1933). 
A first wave took place in the golden age of the argentinian agro-export-led growth and its 
crisis, between 1890 (the year of institution of a currency board in order to insure the 
convertibility of the national paper money) and 1933. We can name it the « Peso moneda 
nacional » wave with seven provinces mainly of the North-West and the West parts of the 
country issuing tax backed quasi-monies more or less sporadically (Table 1). Further research 
should likely drive to divide this wave in separating two periods, before and since the first 
world war, for convertibility with gold was suspended in 1914 (and only restaured in 1927 till 
1929) (Bordo and Veigh, 1998, p. 12). Nonetheless this wave holds its unity from the fact that 
issuances of provincial bonds were made on the same Peso (m$n) standard. 
 
Table 1 : Issuances of provincial quasi-monies between 1891 and 1933 
Unit of account: Peso moneda nacional m$n (1881-1969) 
Provinces concerned  Years of issue of provincial monies  
Corrientes  1891 
Jujuy 1903-1905-1928-1932 
Mendoza   1892-1908 
Salta 1891-1916 – 1921 – 1927 – 1932 - 1933 
San Juan 1894 - 1896 -1899 -1909 -1923 (4% interest) 
Santa Fé 1890 
Santiago del Estero 1891 
Tucuman  1900 - 1915 - 191713 
 
As shown in table 1, the north-western provinces (Jujuy, Salta and Tucuman) were the 
more active. These provinces will be also at the forefront in the second and third waves. But 
between 1934 ant 1984, 50 years of military and/or autoritarian rules, and import-substitution 
led-growth regime associated to a Central Bank (created in 1935) « absolutely centralized » 
(Olivera, 1981, 1989, 1992), there is no trace of any provincial treasury issuing fiscal 
money14.  
 
                                               
12
 Here our main source is http://numismondo/pm/arg/ which may contain some mistakes and be possibly 
incomplete. In a previous paper we have also noticed traces of provincial issue in 1876, 1881, 1883, et 1885 
(Theret and Zanabria, 2007, p. 22). See also Colantonio (2010).  
13
 On the bond of 1917, see Paez de la Torre, 1997. 
14
 The unique evidence is that of one issuance by the Tucuman Province of « certificados de cancelacion de 
deudas » in 1966, but they were not anonymous and looked more as endorsable checks. 
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Figure 3 : One example from Jujuy (1932) 
 
 
2.1.2. The Austral’s (second) wave (1984-1991) 
One has to wait the end of the last military dictatorship, and the return to a fully liberal 
democratic political regime in 1984, to observe new issuances in four north-western 
provinces, starting with Salta in 1984, La Rioja and Tucuman in 1985, and then Jujuy in 
198615.  
This second wave that lasted until 1991 can be denominated the « Austral wave » since it 
coincides with the issue in 1985 of a new national money denominated Austral, in which 
Bocades were convertible at par, thanks to the institution of currency boards managed by the 
public banks of each province16 17.  
                                               
15
 In the World Bank Report of 1990 on Provincial Government Finance, five, including Catamarca, and not four 
provinces are considered as emiting money in this period (World Bank, 1990, p. 77). Cirnigliaro (2004, p. 126) 
also mentions Catamarca as one of the north-western provinces having discussed of a possible monetary regional 
space where bonos from every province could have circulated at par (see below). But we have found no 
numismatic traces of bonos of Catamarca before 1993. That is why we omit them here. 
16
 The first issue of the bond in Salta preceded the « Austral plan » and was denominated in Peso argentino 
(1000 $a = 1 Austral). It had to be surcharged by a stamp to circulate on the basis of Austral standard. 
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Figure 4: The Salta’s Bocade issued in 1984 in Peso Argentino 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The first Bocade of Tucuman issued in 1985 in Austral 
 
                                                                                                                                               
17
 See Del Rey & Oribe (1986), Cerro (1988), Caceres Cano, Druck & Flaja (1993), Beckmann (1985, 2001, 
2002, 2003), Hernandez Meson (2002), Greco (1994) (quoting José Reissig, « Bonds that brought a boom », 
New Economics, n° 20, winter 1990, London, England). 
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The money issued during these years, called « Bocade » in Salta, Tucuman and La Rioja, 
and « Publico » in Jujuy18, was very similar in the four provinces (following the Salta model 
and not bearing interest rate as will generally do the other provincial quasi-monies). 
 
2.1.3. The dollarized Peso’s (third) and its crisis’ (fourth) waves 
 (1992-2000 and 2001-2003) 
After the « convertibility plan » by which the country went out of hyperinflation in 1992, it 
is usually considered that there were no more « quasi-monies » issued by provincial 
governments. People and academics just remember of the successful issue of the « cecor » by 
the government of the Cordoba Province in 1995, by linking it to the « Tequila Effect » crisis. 
This is not right. Only Salta stopped its emissions, and Tucuman (continuously), Jujuy (with 
an interruption between 1992 and 1995), and La Rioja (with an interruption between 1997 and 
2001) carried on issuing Bocade or Publico all along the decade. Moreover other provinces 
                                               
18
 The Province of Jujuy intitled its bond « Titulo Publico al portador », usually called « Publico ». Later some 
other provinces in the North-West will also name theirs bond « Publico », such as Catamarca in 1993 and 
Santiago del Estero (Ciudad de Frias) in 2002. 
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entered the game : Catamarca in 199319 ; Cordoba (Lecor), Formosa (Boncafor), Mendoza 
(Petrobono/Petrom), Rio Negro (petrobono), and San Juan (Huarpes) in 1995 ; Missiones 
(Cemis) in 1996 ; and then Corrientes (Cecacor) in 1999.  
Thus 11 provinces had already started to issue bonds in convertible Peso before the great 
crisis of the currency board at the end of 2001. Therefore it is necessary to distinguish 
between a third and a fourth waves of provincial issuances, the third starting in 1992 and 
going untill 2000. This third wave including 11 provinces and forgotten by the literature 
either scientific or journalistic, we name the « dollarized Peso » wave20. 
The fourth and last wave started in 2001 and included 5 more provinces that were 
newcomers in the movement : Buenos Aires (with Patacon), Chaco (with Quebracho) and 
Entre Rios (with Federal) in 2001,  San Luis (with San Luis) and Santiago del Estero (with 
Publico) in 2002. This last wave (2001-2003), we name the « convertibility crisis and 
dedollarised Peso » wave. But as the provinces of the « dollarized Peso » wave continued to 
issue money untill 2003, the period of the so-called convertibility crisis (2001-2003) 
comprises 16 provinces (over 23 for the whole Argentina) including the largest21. To these 16 
provinces, we must still add municipal monies22 and the federal government itself which also 
issued in these years a large amount of « Lecop ». The Lecop was an interprovincial bond 
(inconvertible in Dollar) that was put into circulation through the system of federal transfers 
to provinces and municipalities, and was legal tender for payment of federal taxes. 
Therefore this last wave has been the most impressive (nearly 40% of the monetary basis 
being made up of provincial fiscal monies in 2002), as impressive as the dollarized Peso 
crisis. But standing back from this short period of open crisis and taking into account the 
previous waves show that provincial issuing of tax anticipation bonds cannot be reduced to 
this episode.  
Another important characteristic of these monetary experiments is their diversity. There 
has been a wide variety of devices associated to the diversity of political and economic 
provincial situations. Some Provinces mobilized currency boards (Cordoba, Entre Rios, 
Tucuman), other not ; some benefited of larger tax bases than other (especially when bonos 
                                               
19
 But as we have seen above, it is possible that Catamarca issued bonos during the second wave. 
20
 Some sources (cf. Licari, Calcagno, Oviedo & Pellegrini, 2003) also mention two others provinces of 
Patagonia with cuasimonedas in 2003, Chubut (Petrobono) and Tierra del Fuego (Letras). Thus if they were to 
be dated from 1995 as for the Petrobono of Rio Negro, it would push the number of provinces belonging to the 
third and fourth waves respectively to 13 and 7 provinces, 18 Provinces being monetarily active in 2002-2003. 
21
 During the last wave, Jujuy did not issue its own money but used patacones from Buenos Aires that were 
usable to pay federal taxes. 
22
 There were at least five municipalities in the province of Cordoba that have issued quasi-monies, of which 
four of them (Cruz del Eje, Dena Funes, Miramar and San Francisco) in the convertible Peso wave (1995), and 
one (Bell Ville) in 2005. Moreover the « Publico » of the province of Santiago del Estero is issued by the city of 
Frias. 
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could be used in payment of national taxes and were circulating in the equalization transfers 
circuit as for Buenos Aires Patacon) ; some could use special resources to back their bonos 
(oil royalties in Mendoza and Rio Negro), other aimed at insuring the value of the bono issued 
on a basket of moneys (San Luis)23. Strategies for building trust, confidence and credibility 
were also quite idiosyncratic. That being said, very few things are known in detail on most of 
these experiments24, and untill now historians have unfortunately failed to record provincial 
and local monetary histories.   
Before examining more in depth the case of Tucuman, it is important to see why issuances 
of provincal bonos have been so recurrent in Argentina.  
 
2.2. Why such a historical recurrence? Argentinian fiscal federalism and shortages 
of currency and credit at the provincial level.  
 
This historical recurrence of provincial fiscal monies in Argentina is to be explained by the 
specific federalist structure of the argentinian political and fiscal systems. Three elements of 
this structure must be outlined: first, fiscal federalism ; second, the monetary regime ; third, 
the constitutional regime. 
 
2.2.1. Fiscal federalism and currency shortage 
As it has been recognized by the World Bank, « understanding the transfers from the 
national to the provincial government is key to understanding provincial finance in 
Argentina » (World Bank, 1990, vol. 1, p. 13). This country is characterized by a strong 
dependance of provincial budgets on federal transfers, and this dependance is coupled with a 
large federal discretion in the distribution.  
Argentinian provinces, with the exception of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (the 
federal capital), depend hugely on federal transfers, the federal government collecting  most 
(around 85%) of the taxes (including social contributions) despite the fact that spendings are 
quite decentralized (around 45% are made at the provincial and municipal levels). The large 
and wealthiest provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, Cordoba and Mendoza (their own 
revenues representing around 30-35% of their total revenues) are less dependant than the 
poorest and peripheral ones (for instance autonomous revenues are worth less than 20 % in 
the nort-western provinces of Jujuy, Salta, and Tucuman, and 10% in Catamarca and La 
                                               
23
 Mendoza issued in 2002 a new bono called « Petrom » and guaranteed by oil royalties. San Luis’ issue has 
been one of the most particular since the « San Luis » was not on the Peso standard, but a new standard in itself, 
its exchange value in Peso was indexed on a basket of five moneys (argentinian Peso, brazilian Real, chilian 
Peso, U.S. Dollar and Euro).  
24
 Nevertheless see Théret and Zanabria (2007, 2009). 
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Rioja) (Saiegh and Tommasi, 2000, p. 69). This very large vertical deficit in the tax primary 
distribution is structural ; it exists since the outset of the Republic, for Buenos Aires has 
always benefited of the monopoly on customs duties that were the main source of tax 
revenues and still are outside the basis of revenue-sharing25.  But it has been much reinforced 
in the eighties by unilateral devolution of social spendings without transfers of the 
corresponding revenues, initiated by the last military dictatorship and carried on untill 1989 
by the following federal government (Falletti, 2010) as shown for Tucuman in Figure 6.  
Like in most federations, federal tax transfers are of three kinds : general revenue sharing 
(equalization), earmarked for a particular use, and purely discretionary. But in Argentina the 
boundaries between these categories are blurred, for even when fixed rules of automatic 
revenue sharing and/or earmarking are edicted, it is recurrent that these rules are either 
bypassed through bilateral negociations between the federal president and governors, or 
permanently renegociated. Before the renewed institutionalization of revenue-sharing in the 
Act of coparticipacion voted in 1988, what dominated was bypassing federal rules ; 
afterwards, it is permanent renegociation of these rules (Bonvecchi, 2005).  
 
Figure 6 : Share of provincial autonomous revenues in Tucuman total spendings  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources : Yanez et alii (2000), Macian de Barbieri et alii (1990 and 2001), and 
 
For these reasons provinces suffer a great instability and uncertainty concerning the true 
amount of federal money they are going to receive annually, monthly, daily. Permanent 
discussions about the effective amounts of federal engagements is coupled with federal 
discretion relative to the agenda of payments. 
                                               
25
 The successful issue of pure fiat paper money in Buenos Aires between 1828 and 1867 was backed on these 
duties (Irigoin, 2003). 
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This uncertainty is increased when the federal government is itself the prey of a fiscal 
crisis. Moreover the money shortage becomes a daily problem for Provinces since transfers’ 
payments tend to feed provincial treasuries’ accounts at irregular pace. In fact federal 
transfers and devolution of public spendings to provinces are often the primary variables of 
adjustment in the management of the Nacion federal budget. And since the argentinian 
economy is characterized by a high degree of volatility and strong dependance vis-à-vis 
external shocks, federal and then provincial fiscal crises are not exceptional. They are 
recurrently expected and always feared.  
Thus it is not a surprise in Argentina to see payments of wages to public employees and/or 
debts vis-à-vis small providers belated and delayed for months. It is not surprising too to see 
these waiting periods correlated with social unrests and emergency situations where 
provincial governments have to borrow money to banks and/or on financial markets in order 
to finance current spendings. This large dependance of provincial governments on federal 
resources explains that their public debt is primarily a floating debt that is funded at high cost.  
 
2.2.2. « Absolute centralization » of the monetary system, 
 and shortage and high cost of credit 
This remark drives us to another element in the conundrum of provincial public finance, to 
say the shortage and correlated high cost of credit for poor peripheral or impoverished 
Provinces. Their economic dependance towards the federal government is not limited to fiscal 
transfers, but is extended to federal monetary policy. Because this monetary policy is 
hypercentralized, the monetary regime being managed exclusively in relation to the exchange 
rate regime and macroeconomic stability, economic interests, public and private, in the 
peripheral provinces are not taken into account. 
This exogenous constraint on provincial finance and local economic development is more 
or less hardened according to periods, since it depends on the type of management of 
monetary policy and institutionnal design of the financial system. In the periods concerned by 
this paper, the Austral and the dollarized Peso periods, credit was a priori easier in the first, 
and more costly and restrained in the second.  
In the Austral period, provinces were assisted by a provincial public bank through which 
they could have access to short term credit, a credit money that these banks could rediscount 
at the Central Bank. But as soon as the rediscount of the Central Bank was more restrictive, as 
it has been for instance the case after 1987 when the Austral was confronted to a renewed 
very high inflation, this source of short term credit could be closed or/and become much more 
costly. Anyway, through this kind of financing, governments were transferring their structural 
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problem of liquidness to their banks, and the consolidated accounts of the provincial public 
sector were not improved. The device only allowed for a better short term smoothing of 
public debt payments. 
In the dollarized Peso period, the argentinian Central Bank (BCRA) was transformed into a 
currency board and forbidden to emit credit money, and most of the Provincial Banks were 
privatized and no more inclined to directly finance provincial deficits at low cost. Hard 
budget constraints were put in place. Provinces had to go on more costly financial markets 
and, for that, could not do anything but to back their loans on their revenue-sharing resources. 
Provincal debt’s burden clumb faster than ever, and their capacity to pay for current expenses 
declined. It is precisely what occured in Tucuman between 1996 and 1999 under Bussi’s 
management who wanted to get rid of the bocade (see below subsection 4.4). 
A second impact on provincial finance of credit shortage and hight cost is indirect. It 
concerns the possibility of funding local economic development and, consequently, the 
enlargement of provincial tax base. Julio Olivera (1981, 1989, 1992) relates this problem to 
the « absolute centralization » of the BCRA. For Olivera, an argentinian economist 
internationally known for its distinction between active and passive money, on the « active » 
side of monetary supply, the « monetary base multiplier » changes according to the provinces 
since the growth of monetary base is inequally distributed among them, inequality reinforced 
by the variety of provincial economic situations. Thus, if a province is in a state of either 
underemployment, or full employment, growth of the monetary supply will stimulate either 
production, or inflation.  Moreover, depending on the presence or absence of regional active 
and wide monetary and financial markets, the mecanisms of monetary transmission will either 
lead up in the productive economy, or be limited to the financial sector. On the « passive » 
side of the monetary demand stimulated by changes in prices and wages, there is also for 
Olivera, even if employment rates are equal, a regional differenciation of the capacity of 
monetary institutions to respond to demand, if they are spatially inequally distributed.  
Therefore Olivera infers that « a rational monetary policy must take into account regional 
differences », and that « the best way to do so is to decentralize the Central Bank » (Olivera, 
1992, p. 9), given that: 
« the optimal degree of decentralization of the Central Bank is not the same for all countries and depends on 
the size of the territory, of the regional diversity, of the financial organization, and of the types of monetary 
policies implemented ».  
 
 Moreover, according to him,  
« the way and the degree of monetary decentralisation should differ from one country to the other, because 
they depend on the optimal level of centralization which must predominate in each country, and on the social 
and political organisations which prevail » (ibid., p. 10).  
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Therefore after having examined different types of Central Banks actually functioning, 
Olivera states that the argentinian one « functions as a totally centralized organism » despite 
its federal juridical statute that should constrain it to take a decentralised form (ibid., p. 14)26. 
Thus, instead of its « absolute centralisation » that is at odd with the federal Constitution of 
the country, the BCRA should be administratively decentralized, according to « the size of the 
country and the magnitude of its interregional differences » (ibid.). 
From this analysis, it can be deduced that structurally, argentinian peripheral provinces are 
confronted to monetary policies and a geographical distribution of monetary institutions that 
do not fit with their economic needs and the stabilization of their public finance. And we can 
better understand why local business classes have been generally supporting the « currency 
finance »27 that provincial governments, in great shortages of national currency and credit, get 
accustomed to rely on. 
 
2.2.3. States of political emergency and provincial States’ initiative to issue local currencies 
Shortage of State money from the top, shortage of market money from the bottom, public 
spendings mainly composed of inelastic social expenses (education, health, security) and 
politically difficult to reduce due to threatening street pressures, uncertainty and discretion in 
the federal delivery of tax transfers, autonomous tax revenues difficult to expand due to weak 
domestic markets and production deprived of an adequate access to credit money and 
investment, here is the set of factors composing the structural conundrum that is susceptible to 
develop in a vicious circle of cumulative and unsustenable provincial indebtment and then 
bankruptcy, and that hopefully issuance of tax anticipation bonds promise to resolve.  
But how can it be possible for provincial government to issue paper money while it is 
forbidden by the federal Constitution (Gallo, 1988)28 ? How is it possible to observe 
                                               
26
 « The decentralisation of the political power and the decentralisation of the economic authority, the political 
federalism and the economic federalism, are the mutually complementary terms of the constitutional binomial 
concerning relations between the Nation and Provinces. (…) That was the doctrine of the lawyer and politician 
santiagueño José Benjamin Gorostiaga, writer of the Constitution. And it was also the thesis of the inspirer and 
interpreter of the Constitution, Juan Bautista Alberdi (…).  The unique way to bring power to the whole country 
– Alberdi sustained - is to distribute in its whole territory the economic causes of the power, the sources and 
elements of wealth, markets and credit » (Olivera, 1992, p. 17).   
27
 On the concept of currency finance, see Ferguson, 1956. 
28
 « En cuanto a la faculdad de las provincias para emitir moneda, esta reglamentada en el articulo 108 de nuestra 
Carta Magna donde se expressa : ‘La provincias no ejercen el poder delegada a la Nacion. No pueden celebrar 
tratados parciales de caracter politico, ni expedir leyes sobre comercio, o navigacion interior o exterior : ni 
establecer aduanas provinciales : ni acuñar moneda : ni establecer bancos con facultad de emitir billetes, sin 
autorizacion del Congresso federal :… Tal como surge del texto precedente, por contrario sensu, las provincias 
estan facultadas tanto para acuñar moneda, como para establecer bancos con facultad de emitir billetes siempre 
que medie autorizacion del Congresso de la Nacion. Y es precisamente esta autorizacion que falta en el caso de 
la monada emitida por el Banco de la Provincia de Tucuman, al igual que con el resto de las monedas norteñas. 
Pero tambien es certo que el Congresso de la Nacion tampoco alzo su voz para condenar la emision de 
monedas provinciales que estaban violando expresas disposiciones constitucionales, como tampoco 
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effectively such paper monies during quite long periods without decisions of the federal 
Supreme Court or modifications of the Constitution? Why «  federal interventores  » 
designated by the federal executive power to substitute temporally failing or too much 
corrupted governors, do not stop these monetary experiments of provincial state money when 
they are in charge, but to the contrary resume or initiate new emissions, as it has been the case 
for instance in 1991 in Tucuman where the interventor Araoz relaunched the issue of Bocades 
in dollarized Peso to replace the Bocades in Austral29, and also in 1999 in Corrientes where 
the Cecacor was launched by the interventor Mestre who, previously as Governor, had 
created in 1995 a quasi-money named Cecor in the Province of Cordoba (Theret and 
Zanabria, 2007)?  
One usual answer to these questions concerning the legitimacy without legality of the 
provincial emissions of money has been that it was tolerated because of the very small 
amounts of money concerned. But this argument, if it can make sense from the point of view 
of mainstream economists and international monetary authorities as IMF and the World 
Bank30, does not fit with the fact that the federal State was actively participating through its 
« interventores » to the issuances31.  
                                                                                                                                               
reacciono el Banco Central de la Republica Argentina para tratar de impedir la emision y circulacion  de 
billetes provinciales impresos en la Casa de Moneda y puestos en circulacion por bancos officiales de 
provincia sujetos a la supervision y contralor de nuestra maxima institucion financiera ; convertido desde 
1935 en agente financiero del Estado por imperio de la ley de su creacion y del texto de su carta organica, no se 
ha lucido para nada en materia de control de estas monedas espurias cuya circulacion publica y notoria en las 
provincias del Norte mencionadas, donde han sido utilizadas profusamente como medio de pago, se ha realizado 
contrariando sabias disposiciones de nuestra Constitucion, a vista y paciencia de todos los functionarios 
nacionales encargados de velar por su estrito cumplimiento. » (Gallo, 1988). 
29
 With the following argument : « Bonds of redemption of debts presently enjoy a good acceptation in the local 
market place ; this acceptation is based on the convertibility system put in place by the government of the 
Province via the operations in force of deposits and exchanges through the Provincial Bank ». (Honorable 
Legislature of Tucuman, Ley n° 6299 of the 23/10/1991, published 08/11/1991 
(http://www.hlt.gov.ar/digest_textoley.php?selley=6299).  
30
 The World Bank point of view was in 1990 the following: « In theory, the provinces cannot emit money and 
must, therefore, finance their deficits either by borrowing from financial institutions or issuing provincial bonds, 
or by the variation of short term assets and liabilities. In fact, one form of "borrowing" currently being used by 
some provinces (Salta, Jujuy, Catamarca, Tucuman and La Rioja) amounts basically to the emission of money, 
in that it consists of issuing "bonds" that have all of the characteristics of money. These provincial bonds can 
be redeemed for Australes on a one-for-one basis by simply presenting them at the Provincial Banks. Provinces 
have used these bonds to finance current expenditures, thereby appropriating the right to seignorage of the 
Central Government. The bonds don't pay interest and seem to be generally accepted as substitutes for Australes 
within the boundaries of the provinces for purchases of smaller amounts (e.g., restaurants, taxis, etc.). By 
restricting the circulation of Australes of smaller denominations, the Provincial Banks force acceptance of 
these bonds. The province converts varying amounts of these bonds into Australes each day, depending on its 
own reserves and its estimates of Australes needed to ‘import’ goods and services from other provinces. The 
total emission of these bonds is, however, relatively small. In Salta, the total amount in circulation is about 
US$ 10 millions, less than six percent of the Province's total need for financing in 1987. In some ways, this 
means of finance seems more of a symbolic way of showing independence, than of financing the deficit. » 
(World Bank, 1990, pp. 77-78). In another report issued in 1996, we find four occurrences of the word « script » 
used for « bono » and associated to the 1995 « Tequila effect » crisis (World Bank, 1996, pp. i, 2, 8, 11) ; the 
issue of « script » is also noticed in the tables but only for 4 provinces (Catamarca, Chaco, Jujuy and Rio 
Negro). There is no prescriptive indications about these scripts, and they are not considered as a 
problem: « several provinces resorted to issuing their own script as a form of payment » (ibid., p. i) ; 
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Thus it seems more acurate to take into consideration three other arguments. The first is 
that, as soon as it was supported by the provincial legislative and juridical (Supreme Court) 
powers, the power of the provincial executive to infringe a Federal Constitution that requires 
the authorization of national Congress to issue money was legitimized by the character of 
emergency and urgency of the situations in which bonos emerged.  
The second is that the Constitutional Text contemplates only two forms of money, the 
« coined » money and paper banknotes. Direct printing by the Treasury of paper money 
backed by taxes is not explicitly considered. Thus the interpretation of bonos as money non 
juridically legitimized is not as straightforward as it seems a priori. 
 The third argument assumes that the federal behaviour of benign neglect or active 
complicity can be understood more easily if we consider that the provincial monies, in a 
federalist framework, are not in competition with the national money but complementary to it. 
From a complementary viewpoint on local monies, as soon as provincial issuances of small 
denominations’ money do not « restrict » the circulation of federal currency and do not 
compete with it, but rather complement it in regional economic and political spaces, they can 
be looked at positively by federal executives whose monetary policy is therefore not 
threatened but rather improved. The situation is different with provincial States issuances of 
credit money through Provincial Banks that are usually partly rediscounted by the Central 
Bank ; in that case, the money issued is of the same nature as the federal money and may 
circulate on the whole territory of the country. Generally there is confusion between both 
forms of money. But as soon as one makes a distinction between the two instruments, the 
federal tolerance of provincial scripts appears to express simply the fact that, from the federal 
economic point of view, they are a complementary money not competing with the national 
money and circulating in limited territorial communities and for small payments. The federal 
attitude means that Bocade, Publico, Federal, Patacon and other bonos are examples of a 
necessary monetary complementarity caused by locality and the overlapping geographical 
scales of payments circuits. 
 
3. The case of the Bocade issued by the tucuman provincial government. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
« Because of the "Tequila effect", privatization of Provincial Banks and deteriorating fiscal condition of many 
provinces, private banks were more reluctant to lend to the provinces. The immediate result of this credit crunch 
was to expand floating debt; i.e. further delay of payments to vendors, contractors and other suppliers and in 
some severe cases, payment of salaries with provincial bonos or script » (ibid., p. 11). 
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 One can also recall the fact that Domingo Cavallo himself, the father of the convertibility plan who was back 
in office as federal ministry of finance during the crisis of 2001, urged the governor of the Province of Buenos 
Aires to issue the Patacon, and finally was also the father of the Lecop, the federal bono. 
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Some questions about the tucuman Bocade will be addressed: why was it issued? How did 
it work? How did it evolve when facing the problem of the high volatility of monetary policy 
at the national level ? How did it manage the transition from an inflationary to a deflationary 
regime ? How were produced the confidence, credibility and trust in the local money ? What 
were the social, territorial and political conflicts the local monetary regime was able to 
regulate ? Isn’t it a typical case of monetary federalism ? 
Let’s come now to the specific case of the tucuman Bocade. We have chosen to focus our 
investigation on this experiment for three reasons : firstly it was the only experiment with a 
quite significative amount of money issued32 that allowed to have a long term perspective, 
and that seemed not to be completely conditionned by economic situation and external 
context (it survived to crises). 
Secondly it had an outstanding heuristical interest since Tucuman has always been 
historically on the forefront of provincial paper money issuance and, despite its small 
economic and demographic size, has had historically a specific and important political and 
symbolic position within the Argentine Republic. 
Thirdly Tucuman is at the heart of the peripheral region of the North West where issuances 
of provincial money have been directly linked to regionalism and federalist stakes (see above 
the banner of the first Bocade note issued in 1985).  
The Bocade was issued for the first time in August 1985 for an amount of 10 millions 
Australes, and it was totally redeemed in August 2003, after no less than 40 issuances (26 in 
Austral, and 14 in Peso). Figures 7 and 8 give an overview of the amounts issued in nominal 
and deflated values.  
 
 
Figure 7: Evolution of the nominal value of the stock of Bocades  
(1 peso post-1991 = 10 000 australes) 
                                               
32
 Tucuman in 2002 was the fifth province in terms of amount of money issued (after Buenos Aires, Cordoba, 
Entre Rios y Corrientes). But, despite an unfavourable position in the provincial hierarchy of wealth and tax 
autonomy (compared for instance to Buenos Aires and Cordoba), it did not know during the dollarized Peso 
crisis a depreciation as strong as Federal (Entre Rios) and Cecacor (Corrientes). 
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Figure 8: Stock and circulation33 of Bocades from August 1985 till August 2003 deflated 
by the CPI index of the Gran Tucuman (in millions of 2003 pesos)  
Sources : Beckman (1985, 2001, 2002, 2003); Cerro, (1988); Caceres Cano, Druck & Flaja (1993); Hernandez 
Meson (2002); Cerro (2002) 
 
Let’s see now why it was issued and how it functioned at its outset, and then how it 
evolved along the 18 years of its life. 
 
                                               
33
 Only a part of the entire stock of bonos was circulating. We computed this part in circulation from Cerro 
(1988) for the period 09/1985 – 09/1987 and by extrapolation on the period 10/1987 – 11/1991 (using the means 
rate on the period covered by Cerro : 59,67%). Fragmental informations in newspapers were also helpful. For the 
following period of the dollarized Peso Bocade, we applied also the approximate rate of 60% which is supported 
by the following statement of the BCRA: « It is estimated that on average 60% of the quasi-monies issued were 
used as medium of payment, meanwhile the 40% remaining was kept under the supervision of financial 
institutions », Boletin monetario y financiero del BCRA, edicion anual 2002, p. 43. Nevertheless fragmented 
informations indicate that it is likely a minimum rate, especially in periods of high national monetary shortage 
like 2001-2003. Thus real circulation should be better considered as being in between the two lines of the figure. 
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3.1. Why was it issued? 
 
We have already given above an answer to this question, for the Bocade was not different 
from other provincial tax-based monies emitted to respond to local shortages of credit and 
currency. The Bocade is a typical example of currency finance. Nevertheless in its case, it is 
important to stress two things. Firstly it draws attention on the fact that money shortage can 
be the result of not only a deflationist regime as was the Convertibility regime of the nineties, 
but also of high inflation regime as was the Austral regime in the eighties. Secondly the 
political and symbolical dimensions of the emergence of the Bocade seem quite important ; it 
has to be regarded also as an instrument of autonomisation of a province belonging to the 
North-West Region (NOA) of Argentina. This dimension, combined with the fact that it has 
been significantly supported by the tucuman business class, could explain partly its lasting 
character. 
The first purpose of the Bocade when it has been implemented was to stabilize political 
and social conflicts, notably between the government and civil servants (the local police was 
engaged in social unrest), by giving to the provincial government the immediate means for 
paying their wages to public employees, payments that had been delayed since several 
months. But the purpose of the bono was also to redress the public finances of the province by 
reducing the public debt and its heavy burden on the budget. As empirical evidence of this, it 
is convenient to quote Rienzo Cirnigliaro, the minister of finance in charge of the 
implementation of the Bocade and the main actor of its good reception among the population : 
«  We started our work by acting on the economy and equilibrating the finances. We had found an empty 
coffer, one month and a half of wages’ debts, anticipated payments of revenue-sharing transfers, and moreover, 
late payments of wages with till 25 days of delay. (…) While the debt due at the 31st of December 1984 was 3.7 
millions of Australes, it was of 21.5 millions the 30th of  June 1985, the new endebtment of the first semester 
being 17.8 millions. Between the factors of this new endebtment there was 5 millions corresponding to a fall in 
federal transfers, 7 millions of provincial taxes to be levied, 2.8 millions of interests on the debts contracted… 
From August  1985, salaries were payed entirely, and the process of indebtness due to belated payments of 
wages was stopped. The total debt in this domain was completely settled the 24th of December 1985. In five 
months we succeeded in paying the equivalent of six and a half months of public wages, in a critical and hard 
financial context. Till now the Bank of the Province of Tucuman was helping financially the State, some months 
by advances of 80% of the total spending for salaries. At the end of 1985, the balance of the account of the 
Province at the bank began to be positive. » (Cirnigliaro, 2004, pp. 116-117). 
 
As for the capacity of the Bocade to reduce the cost of debt issuing and cumulative 
indebtness, it has been demonstrated by one of the rare empirical economic studies made on 
provincial bonos (Cerro, 1988). While the author was not in favour of such a monetary 
experiment (see below), he nevertheless concluded that the Bocade was a very much cheaper 
mode of financing the public deficit than other financial alternatives. He computed that on the 
period going from August 1985 to September 1987, the difference between the cost of issuing 
and supporting the Bocades, and alternative modes of financing either through the Provincial 
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Bank and the regulated discount of the BCRA, or through financial market, was huge : the 
monthly cost was US$ 53.546 on one side, US$ 849.891 on the other side, differences 
corresponding to real interest rates of 0,83% against 7,25%. Thus actually the Bocade was a 
good instrument to reduce the public debt : « El bono fue un negocio » (La Gaceta of the 23 
rd of November 1988)34. 
Concerning the purpose of reducing the currency shortage, it is also clearly recognized by 
the minister Cirnigliaro in the book of his political memories, despite he does not seem really 
ready to consider the Bocade as a pure currency, but rather as « an instrument of short term 
credit » (ibid., p. 125).  
« We choose to create a transitional instrument – the Bocades (…) – which did not yield interests and should 
resolve the currency shortage. The following governors Domato, Araoz, Ortega and Bussi have chosen an easier 
but more expensive alternative, combining the use of Bocades with emission of classical bonds and banking 
credit that were expensive and have generated a snowball effect in the public debt. (…) The Bocade had the 
advantage to be a loan from the People to the State, with an interest rate nill. (…) » (ibid., pp. 122 - 123).   
 
Thus the creation of the Bocade fits perfectly well with  the notion of currency finance, but 
the position of its founding father, R. Cirnigliaro, was ambivalent35. For instance there is a 
curious paradox in his political position concerning the status and the future of the bond. 
After having stressed the importance and necessity of the Bocade as a regional tool of 
economic development in the federal context of Argentina, he concludes with the possibility 
and even the necessity to redeem it as soon as public finance would be in order, which is 
contradictory with the political and symbolical dimensions that he gives otherwise to the 
provincial money and which required its permanence.  
On one side, he states the following: 
« If the governments that followed us would have stabilized public finances as we have done it, in 
rationalizing public spending, in making efficient social spending, in increasing public investment and 
transforming the State into a promoter of economic development, the bonos would not have had any motive to 
carry on during 18 years » (ibid., pp. 126-27). 
 
On the other side, he tells us: 
                                               
34
  Another study concludes also that the cost of issuances of the Austral Bocades was low (about 4,5% for each 
issuance) and that the net financial benefit for the Provincial treasury for the whole set of emissions between 
1985 and 1991, benefit produced by seignoriage and inflationary tax according to the authors, was of 164 
millions of pesos in prices of may 1992, viz. about three and four months of budgetary incomes respectively in 
1992 and 1985 (Caceres Cano, Druck & Flaja, 1993, p. 11, 16 and 19). Nevertheless, through a bipapelist model 
of neutral money, this study concludes as Cerro (1988) that the experiment affected negatively the welfare of the 
provincial population since the government was not able to back the bono at any moment in peso, despite for its 
authors, « from a theoretical point of view, with the issuance of bonos, the government has the possibility to get 
benefits and moreover to improve positively the welfare of the society » (ibid., p. 19). But this evaluation is 
tightly connected to the « currency school » point of view adopted by this scholars. 
35
 We find the same ambivalence vis-à-vis the Bocade in the local business class and the declarations of the 
Federacion Economica Tucuman (FET).  In the same time that they were rescuing the convertibility of the 
Bocade in Austral in 1988 with arguments putting in the front place « not the particular interests of the members 
of the FET, but a moral compromise with the whole community » (La Tarde, « Operatoria Unica », San Miguel 
de Tucuman, 17/02/1988), they were pleading for their slow disparition (« El retiro paulitino de los bonos de la 
circulacion reclama la FET. En un extenso documento formula criticas a la politica oficial », La Gaceta, San 
Miguel de Tucuman, 3/03/1988). 
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« In fact, the highest virtue of the provincial bonos, at least of the tucuman one as it has been 
implemented, was its conversion from an instrument of short term credit into an instrument of defense of 
the power of decision or sovereignty, as we can call it, of the Provincial States. It happened to be a federal 
call. It was not a matter of chance or improvisation. It was contemplated on the notes of the first and sole issue 
of the Riera Government, where the following sentence (from Riera himself) was writen: Should the Federalism 
feeds red and warm the living cell of the Nation » (ibid., p. 125). 
« Legally we are organized as a federal country, but in fact we constitute a unitary country. The 
resolution of this problem should be prioritary to reorganize the Nation. Provinces preexisted to the Nation, 
and they entrusted it with the task to levy some common taxes and from the resulting amount, to deduce the 
expenses for the functioning of the national State. Why provinces have to go to Buenos Aires in order to meet a 
civil servant, the State Secretary of Treasury, who is not elected, is not even a politician, and does not know the 
provinces, but determines how much and how he will send to them a money which is their money » (ibid., p. 
126). 
 
Or still : 
« (…) the bono disappeared in the Miranda government, at the expense of high provincial fiscal costs, 
according to the requisite of the IMF which required the redemption of these monies since they were 
ruining the business of the external and « eternal » debt. There is no doubt that monetary issuance rooted in 
the production of goods is not inflationist, and in such a context, the rehabilitation of money and credit as 
instruments of development are national decisions that are at odd with the concentrating and outward looking 
neoliberal model » (ibid., 126). 
 
 So on the one hand, for Cirnigliaro, once the Bocade would have done the job of reducing 
the public debt, and if the government would have acted in favour of economic development, 
it should be no more necessary to mobilize its mediation to maintain the community and it 
could be redeemed. Moreover, Cirnigliaro seems to ignore the economic dimensions of fiscal 
monies circulating in treasury circuits, and so doing he returns to an instrumental and unitary 
view of money. This view seems contradictory with the federalist and antineoliberal 
declarations he makes on the other hand, and that explain the quasi-simultaneous emissions of 
Bocades not only in Tucuman, but also in Salta, Jujuy, La Rioja, and perhaps Catamarca (cf. 
footnote 14 above) and Santiago del Estero too, as suggested by Cirnigliaro36.  
The Bocade, for Cirnigliaro, was clearly an « instrument of provincial emancipation » (p. 
126) from the outstanding invasive power of Buenos Aires. It was a financial instrument of a 
federal character in the new democratic context, a regional type of money that was a 
symbolic manifestation of monetary federalism. Cirnigliaro is thus not far from regarding the 
Bocade as a potential instrument of renegociation and adaptation of the federal monetary 
constitution, in order to take into account the detrimental effects on peripheral provinces of a 
centralized monetary policy. In this perspective, he recalls in his book that, during his office 
as minister of economy, he had talks with his colleagues of the surrounding provinces of 
                                               
36
 « En plena vigencia del Plan Primavera de Alfonsin, cualquier ciudadano con un bono de A 10 Austral, 
compraba 10 US$ y recibia dos Australes de vuelta. Esta era la realidad, por mas que los academicos 
monetaristas se empeñen en demostrar que el valor del dinero se vincula al circulante, a la tasa de interés, a la 
inflacion, etc. Se puso en evidencia que un papel firmado por Riera y su Ministro de Economia, podia cambiarse 
por uno firmado por el Presidente del Banco Central y por otro firmado por el Secretario del Tesoro 
norteamericano. Que es el dollar, sino un papel verde o un « bono » de los EEUU que, en virtud de la inflacion 
del resto de los paises localizados en su area de influencia, puede financiar un deficit anual equivalente al 
producto bruto argentino ? » (ibid., p. 123). 
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Jujuy, Salta, Catamarca and Santiago del Estero, about a possible regionalisation of their 
respective bonos, in order to guarantee their circulation at par in the whole North-Western 
Region (NOA), a project in which the Banco de la Provincia de Tucuman would have 
possibly operated as a clearing house and/or a compensation cashdesk. 37 Despite this project 
did not go further, it made sense since Salta was the first province to renew, as soon as 1984 
(before the Austral plan), with the issue of provincial monies, and largely influenced the 
implementation of bonos of the same type in Tucuman and La Rioja in 1985, and in Jujuy in 
198638.  
Moreover the political and symbolical dimensions of the provincial money that Cirnigliaro 
underlines are not the normative product of his sole imaginary. As himself recalls, they were 
also shared by the Governor of the province, the peronist Fernando Riera, who had hired him 
as a Minister, and had signed the federalist sentence on the banner of the first series of Bocade 
notes. These federalist feelings of the tucuman peronists also found echoes in the political 
pro-Bocade attitude of the provincial business community. In the display advertisement 
presented in figure 9, this attitude is clearly asserted and appears outstanding. In this poster 
published in 2001, the business community organized around the Tucuman Economic 
Federation (FET) stressed the importance of the « Tucuman Money » as a mean of keeping 
alive a local community of payments, and the questions of trust, confidence and credibility in 
the provincial money as well as a call for solidarity in order to save it, are put in the forefront.  
This means that, while most of the political elites were operating their conversion to 
neoliberalism in the nineties, the Bocade was still in 2001 strongly supported by local 
economic interests who saw it not only as an economic instrument, but also as a 
representation of their mutual interdependances and of their belonging to a territorial 
community of local development39.  
We can therefore speak of a special north-western (NOA) sub-type of argentinian bono 
which has been particularly resilient, as we have seen in section 2. But what are the 
                                               
37
 ‘In this context, the bono was an instrument of provincial emancipation. A financial instrument of a 
monetary nature, but of a federal character. There has been a moment in my management where we begun to 
speak with the ministers of Economy from Catamarca, Jujuy, Salta and Santiago del Estero, about the possibility 
to regionalize the bonds of each province, and to guarantee their circulation in the Argentinian North-West 
(NOA). In this project which did not have continuation, we thought that the Bank of the Province of Tucuman, 
then a provincial public bank, could play the role of clearing or of a compensation cashdesk » (ibid., p. 126). 
38
 On the Bocade of Salta, see Del Rey and Oribe (1986). 
39
 That is why, from the study of the tucuman Bocade, it seems possible to draw insights concerning the political 
and symbolical factors of the resilience and recurrence of provincial issuance of local currencies in Argentina, 
especially in its north-western region, that confort a non instrumental and non unitary point of view on money. 
One of these insights, in line with Olivera’s analysis of the « absolute centralisation » of the argentinian Central 
Bank, should be that the main factor explaining political and monetary instability in Argentina is « repressed » 
monetary federalism. The often remarked contradiction between the juridical definition and practical political 
functioning of the Argentinian federation can perhaps find there partial factors of explanation.  
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peculiarities of these Bocades of the NOA type and especially of the tucuman bono that we 
better know?  
 
Figure 9 : Tucuman entrepreneurs supporting the Bocade in 200140 
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 « STANDING UP FOR THE BOCADE IS STANDING UP FOR TUCUMAN. The signing entities, 
concerned with provincial interests, support the Bocade and the so called Operatoria FET. The Tucuman money 
above all, which during the 16 years of its existence allowed our companies, trades and industries to have at their 
disposal for their business a currency flow, is the Bocade. The Tucuman Bono has allowed us to face successive 
national crises, hyperinflation, recession, adjustments in the National Economy, etc. Today newly the 
circonstancies make the Bocade an essential device for the working of the economy of Tucuman. It is why we 
ask insistently the community in general to lend a hand all together, giving backing and a support which re-
creates confidence in this Tucuman money. This trust in the BOCADE is also sustained by its convertibility in 
the legal tender currency, condition guaranteed by the sure device that has proved to be the Operatoria FET, and 
whose no other provincial currencies or bonds have. But all this backing must result from an effort shared by 
everybody, and there must be no exception in the acceptance of the bonds ; consequently we call all the utility 
companies to commit themselves, in an attitude of solidarity, to accept the Bocades at their nominal value, 
besides an adequate treatment of the conversion of the bonos by the financial system. This way of acting and this 
solidarity will ensure the effectiveness and credibility of this provincial money which, in the present 
circonstancies of currency shortage, are necessary for us ».  
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A first striking difference, purely empirical, is that Bocades41 were the only quasi-monies 
emerging and maintaining them in the Austral period of high and then hyper inflation. 
Another outstanding peculiarity of Bocades, theoritically speaking, is that whereas Patacones, 
Cecors, Lecors, Cecacors, Federales, Quebrachos, etc. have been officially bearing interest, 
Bocades were non interest bearing assets, even if, at least in the case of Tucuman, the 
possibility for them to pay interest was not excluded by the Act authorizing its issue, but has 
never been put into practices (see below, article 6 of the Ley 5728). Like the federal Lecop 
issued in 2001, they were convertible fiat currencies anchored in the national money42. 
This is not coincident that these north-western provinces represent the older part of 
Argentina where provincial belonging is an important part of individual identity. It reveals the 
outstanding political nature of a local money of this type: here financial market incentives for 
building trust and confidence in the currency, as interest rate, have been excluded ; since the 
onset of the emissions, incentives aiming at stimulating the demand for the notes were looked 
for through lotteries, a traditionnal fiscal instrument of the States. 
At last, another possible important specificity of NOA bonos is not so much the 
institutional fact that they mobilise currency boards to insure their convertibility43, for it has 
been also the case of the Cordoba’s Cecor and Entre Rios’ Federal, but the political fact that 
its convertibility which was not easy to maintain, especially in time of high and hyper-
inflation, was de facto and sometimes very explicitly defended by the local business 
community, even when the political ruling class was in a hurry to come back to « normality ».   
 
3.2. How did the Bocade function at its outset and stabilize? 
 
Let’s come now to a more precise presentation of how the Bocade was issued and 
regulated in the province of Tucuman. Figure 10 displays its legislative Act of birth in a 
lonely page (three pages were used in the original form), which shows how simple and short 
has been the juridical work to institute it. Only eight articles properly concern the issue of the 
bond and its regulation :  
Art. 1 mainly defines the amount of emission authorized by the legislative power. It 
stipulates an important rule of possible adjustment of this amount by indexation on a local 
price index. 
                                               
41
 And « Publicos » in Jujuy and perhaps Catamarca, but, to date, we know really quasi nothing about these 
experiments. 
42
 In the NOA, the interest bearing means of payment were called certificates (like cecades issued in La Rioja 
and Salta in 1988) and not bonds. 
43
 On the institutional similarities between the Bocades of Salta and Tucuman, see Del Rey & Orive (1986) and 
Cerro (1988). 
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Art. 2 announces that the bonds are issued to the bearer, and that they have a limited life 
length fixed by law. 
Art. 3 stipulates that they are a State money, a medium of payment of debts issued by the 
provincal Treasury and rationed by the whole set of State’s organisations which can use it 
also for intrastate transactions. It specifies that the redeeming power of a bono is equal to its 
nominal value. It defines the use and holding of Bocades as founded on free acceptation and 
not on legal tender, and precises that they are accepted for taxes and other payments to the 
public sector.  
Art. 4 states that the Bocade is convertible at par in the legal tender federal money and 
exchangeable at the Bank of the Province so instituted as a local currency board (caja de 
conversion), leaving the definition of the methods of actual exchange (periods, places and 
schedule) to decrees of the executive power.  
Art. 5 defines a possible use of the Bocade for legal guarantees and deposits. 
Art. 6 is relative to the possibility for Bocades to pay interests during the three first months 
of its circulation (which has never been the case as we already note it). 
Art. 7 authorizes the executive power to create lotteries and define the modes of their 
functioning. 
Art. 8 suggests to municipalities to adopt similar norms concerning articles 3 and 5 of the 
Act.   
Thus is defined a non legal tender tax anticipation script, a temporary bond of redemption 
of debts denominated in the federal unit of account, and convertible, under specific conditions 
to be fixed by the provincial government, at par with the legal tender federal money till his 
date of nullity.  
But this definition does not tell us how this money worked concretely, beyond the apparent 
simplicity for defining it legally. In fact the most important point on which to focus on now, is 
the way the regime of convertibility concretely functioned and adapted to changes in the 
economic and political national environnement. And for an understanding of this regime, we 
have to start from the outset : how was concretely organised in 1985 the change at par of 
Bocades into the legal tender Austral?  
The Bocade was introduced in the economic circuit through wages and payments of 
providers of the public sector. It came back in the public coffers through two main channels : 
first through the payment of provincial taxes and other public fees, secondly through its 
exchange in Austral at the Provincial Bank.  
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Figure 10 : The Act of birth of the Bocade 
 
HONORABLE LEGISLATURA DE TUCUMÁN 
LEY N°: 5.728 - LEY CADUCA POR OBJETO CUMPLIDO O PLAZO VENCIDO
FACULTA AL P. E. A EMITIR "BONOS DE CANCELACION DE DEUDAS" "BOCADE", DEL 
ESTADO PROVINCIAL PARA PAGO DE DEUDAS DEL ESTADO PROVINCIAL 
SANCIONADA EN FECHA 24-07-1985 * PROMULGADA EL 29-07-1985 * PUBLICADA EL 20-08-1985 
Modificada por Ley 5.866 - 6.232 - 6.299 - 6.678 - 6.969 - Caducada por Ley 8.153 
 * CADUCA *     El Senado  y Cámara de Diputados de la Provincia de Tucumán, sancionan con fuerza de  
LEY : 
Artículo 1º.- Facúltase al Poder Ejecutivo a emitir "Bonos de  Cancelación  de  Deudas" por la suma de 
A 10.000.000 (diez millones de Australes), en las series que se determinen en  cada oportunidad, para ser 
aplicados al pago de deudas del  Estado  Provincial.  Los bonos podrán asimismo, ser entregados con  igual  
finalidad  a  los  organismos descentralizados entidades  autárquicas  y a empresas y sociedades del Estado. El 
monto  autorizado  podrá ser actualizado al momento de cada emisión  conforme  a las variaciones que 
experimente el Indice de Precios al Consumidor de Bienes y Servicios en San Miguel de  Tucumán 
elaborado por la Dirección de Estadística de la  Provincia de Tucumán."  
 
Art. 2º.- Los  bonos de cancelación de deudas se emitirán al portador,  llevarán  indicado  el  número de 
esta ley, la serie a  que corresponden y contendrán las formalidades previstas en  los  artículos  744 y 745 del 
Código de Comercio, sin perjuicio  de las que estime conveniente el Poder Ejecutivo y caducarán el 30 de 
noviembre de 1987. 
      
Art. 3º.- Los  bonos  serán  entregados  por la Tesorería General de la Provincia o por las entidades 
descentralizadas autárquicas y  empresas y sociedades del Estado a los acreedores que  acepten  los  
mismos en pago de sus créditos, pudiendo también  ser utilizados para cancelar deudas de organismos 
estatales entre sí. Asimismo, la administración  central,  las  entidades desentralizadas, autárquicas  y  
sociedades y empresas del Estado, aceptarán  los bonos en cancelación total o parcial de sus créditos  en  
dinero  cualquiera  fuere  la causa de los mismos.  En todos los casos el poder cancelatorio de los bonos 
será a su valor nominal.      
 
Art. 4º.- Los  bonos serán canjeables por moneda de curso legal, al  100%  (cien por ciento) de su valor 
nominal en el Banco de  la  Provincia de Tucumán, en los plazos, lugares y horarios que  a  ese  fin 
determinará el Poder Ejecutivo sin quebrantar el  principio  de igualdad entre los tenedores de los bonos. 
La recuperación de los bonos se debitará en la cuenta que en el  Banco de la Provincia de Tucumán, 
habilitará el Poder Ejecutivo a  estos  efectos,  conforme  al procedimiento que establecerá la 
reglamentación que se dicte.      
 
Art. 5º.- Las  fianzas  y  cauciones  reales exigidas por leyes de  la  Provincia,  podrán constituirse 
utilizando los bonos cuya emisión se autoriza por esta ley.      
 
Art. 6º.- Los  bonos  podrán  devengar un interés nominal mensual durante los tres primeros meses a 
contar de la fecha de emisión  de  cada serie. Dicho interés podrá ser variable para una misma serie y será 
pagadero mensualmente en bonos y en la forma que determine la reglamentación.      
 
Art. 7º.- Se  autoriza  al  Poder  Ejecutivo a establecer premios por sorteo a los tenedores de bonos, con 
las modali- dades que se dispongan en la respectiva reglamentación.      
 
Art. 8º.- Las  Municipalidades  de  la  Provincia,  en el ámbito de  sus  respectivas  jurisdicciones,  
podrán adoptar normas similares  a  las contenidas en los artículos 3º y 5º de la presente ley.      
 
Art. 9º.- Las erogaciones que demande el cumplimiento de esta ley, serán atendidas con recursos de rentas 
generales.      
Art. 10.- El  Poder  Ejecutivo  reglamentará  la presente ley, dentro de los treinta días de su promulgación.      
Art. 11.- Comuníquese.      
 
Dada en  la  sala de sesiones de la Honorable Legislatura de la  Provincia de Tucumán, a los veinticuatro días 
del mes de julio del año mil novecientos ochenta y cinco.  
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The first channel was the most confortable for the Province, since within it the government 
did not have to change Bocades for Australs. But this channel was very narrow, since the 
autonomous revenues of the Province in proportion of its total public spendings was quite low 
(around 20% only). To enlarge this channel, it would have been necessary to increase 
autonomous revenues, a task very difficult to take on at once.   
The second channel was therefore the most important to ensure the bono’s credibility 
whose permanent holding by the population and circulation without discount in the market 
sphere were testimony. Within this second channel, what was important was not to maximize 
the return of bonds in the treasury’s coffers as for the first channel, but to the contrary to 
minimize this return. As an incentive for holding the bonds, lotteries were preferred to 
payments of interests. The lotteries occured weekly and in exceptional occasions (using the 
four – for weekly draws - or five – for exceptional  draws - last numerals of the series’ 
number of the notes). The Caja Popular de Ahorros de la Provincia (Provincial Popular 
Savings Bank) was in charge of these lotteries and delivered weekly premiums of twenty 
times the value of the winning notes, or for exceptional draws large cars or even houses. 
But the main device to ensure confidence in and credibility of the Bocade was the way 
effective convertibility was provided. One condition for an extended use of the Bocade in 
market exchanges and payments of debts was that people thought that the parity between the 
bond and the legal tender would be maintained, and that at any moment, in a reasonable  lapse 
of time, they could get legal tender cash or « effectivo » (effective Austral) by changing their 
Bocades at their nominal value. Another condition was that people in need of spending their 
money outside the province, could also easily change their bonos at par in the national money.  
The exchange device, such as it has been primarily instituted, was the following. The 
Banco de la Provincia de Tucuman, as the financial agent of the provincial treasury, played 
the role of a currency board (Caja de conversion). People could change their Bocades at its 
branches and counters, as well as in the Provincial Savings Bank, and with a small discount in 
some other banks. But there were restrictions: the change was open only on working days and 
during the 10 days between the 18th and 28th of each month. These restrictions allowed the 
Bocade to function as a pure short term credit instrument, since even if all the Bocades in 
circulation were presented for change every month, the device gave time to the provincial 
treasury, during the period of closure of the change, to collect effective Australs and so avoid 
liquidity problems. This credit being quasi-gratis as we have seen above in quoting the work 
of Cerro (1988), the Province was thus able to reduce its floating debt.  
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Another important effect expected from the Bocade was to permit the government to pay 
in time, and not late as it had become usual, the wages of the public employees. Thus the 
bono was an instrument of social peace-making by avoiding social unrest.  
But it was financially much more interesting for the provincial government, as well as for 
the business community in some measure, that the bono remained in market circulation for a 
large part, and had not to be refinanced in Austral every month. Only at that condition, it 
could be a device for reducing monetary shortage. Moreover, the fact that it stayed in 
circulation was a proof of its credibility.  
What happened actually ?  For the minister Cirnigliaro, the official father of the device, it 
was the following :  
« Ten millions of Pesos en Australes bonos have been issued which were maintained into an exchange 
regime of one Austral (in bono) for one Austral (in legal tender cash) at the bank. (…) Moreover there were 
lottery’s premiums that sustained their holding, and they benefited of a very good public acceptation, as long as 
they could be effectively changed freely in legal tender money between the 18th and 28th of each month. The 
first month has been the harder (September 1985). The 18th of the month, a true avalanche occured at the bank. 
We had 9 millions of Australes in cash for sustaining the change which, this first day, has been of nearly 7.5 
millions, meanwhile around one million were changed the second day. Afterwards, there has been practically no 
exchanges. We payed that month the wages in time, and worked in order to gather the 10 millions of Australes 
we needed for the next change. This time, on the first day, the amount of exchanges has been less than 50% of 
our liquid assets at the Provincial Bank. In the subsequent months, at the end of the period of exchange at the 
Bank, the amount of bonos applying for change represented 70% of the total issued. It was a clear signal that the 
people had acquired the trust necessary for a short term credit instrument functioning as a currency. The public 
held it, to the point that its acceptation was increasing » (Cirnigliaro, 2004, p. 122-123). 
 
E. Cerro, an economist author of one of the rare academic papers on the Bocade44, 
describes the functioning of the Bocade in its first two years of existence as follows:  
« The provincial Government started issuing the « bonds of redemption of debts »  in August 1985 with notes 
of distinct denomination between 0,10 to 10 Australes. The Provincial Act N° 5728 authorized the executive 
power to make supplementary issuances. The State made use of these faculties in some occasions. The bonds, 
put into circulation in order to redeem government debts, were used to pay belated wages of public servants and 
providers’ invoices, and other creditors of the State in general. Although acceptation of the bonds was formally 
volontary, in fact it was compulsory since refusing it signified the impossibility to see her/his financial claim 
redeemed. The bonds were recycled, since the State received them at their nominal value in payments of taxes, 
cotisations, fees, etc., and they were also valid for the compensation of debts between public organisms. 
Individuals also could make use of them in their bilateral transactions. In other words the provincial State issued 
a currency refered to the Austral standard, which could be freely changed at par with effective Austral, but could 
circulate only within the boundaries of the Province of Tucuman » (Cerro, 1988, pp. 326-327). 
 
Cerro, as seen previously, has demonstrated the great efficiency of the device concerning 
its capacity to reduce the public debt and the deficit, stressing the role of lotteries in the 
building of acceptation of the bonds in circulation. He has shown how cheap has been this 
system, even compared to the regulated rediscount at the BCRA. Nevertheless his evaluation 
of the Bocade was finally quite negative, since he thought that : 
« the financial advantages that this system granted has not been appreciated at their real value by the 
government, since even at the moment of their launching, the bonos were not accompanied by policies aimed at 
building credibility, supporting and trust. To the contrary lotteries were not promoted (and were soon cancelled), 
the maximum amount of emission authorized by the Ley 5728 (A 10 millions indexed on a wholesale price 
                                               
44
 Till now we have found only two academic papers concerning the tucuman bocade. 
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index…) was not respected, the exchange in Austral was always risky for bond’s holders, and the State, far from 
showing a rigourous and orderly conduct in its management of public finance, had deepened the political line 
that had previouly driven it to bankruptcy » (ibid., pp. 333-334).  
 
Thus, Cerro, while acknowledging that « the bono was an excellent device for financing 
the fiscal deficit and avoid financial costs », and also recognizing that «  the tucuman 
community was supporting, holding, and using the bonos », concluded that « the final 
outcome was negative for the province of Tucuman » (ibid. pp. 334-335). In other words, the 
system was good, but it has been badly used and managed45. Paradoxically Cirnigliaro, in 
2004, is not very far from this evaluation, but he makes an important nuance. He considers 
also restrospectively that the system was good but has been effectively not properly used and 
managed, but with the restriction that this had been the case only after he left the government 
(February 1987). He describes his own management as successful and criticizes only the later 
governments that followed the Riera administration46.  
But both Cirnigliaro and Cerro clearly are not objective and desinterested observants. It is 
a priori possible that Cirnigliaro embellishes the situation in the years of his managment, but 
it is also possible that Cerro, reasonning and writing in 1988, i.e. in a critical year where the 
Bocade was suffering its first « small crisis » (according to Fernando Cortes, the minister of 
finance in charge that year47), was projecting the situation of 1988 retrospectively on the two 
initial years of Cirnigliaro’s administration. Thus we are confronted to the subjectivities of a 
political actor and an economist, both defending specific interests, values and creeds. 
Therefore more objective criteria and instruments are needed and have to be found to better 
appreciate what has been the effective state of affairs. 
 
3.3. How did the Bocade of Tucuman evolve in order to face the national volatility of 
monetary policy and instability and/or scarcity of the legal tender currency ?    
 
In order to have such a more objective view, let’s come now to the history and evolution of 
the Bocade. Starting from a general description of the different periods of its life, we shall 
examine then the successive national crises it muddled through (1987-1988, 1990-1991; 
1995-1996; 2001-2003), and the institutional changes they initiated. Our aim here is to 
understand how complementarity caused by locality can function in the frame of national 
                                               
45
 We find the same idea in Caceres Can, Druck & Flaja (1993) (see footnote 29 above).  
46
 « The later administrations forgot that the bono was an instrument of short term credit and of a transitory 
character, whose purpose was only to overcome a deficit which must be transitory. The deficit must be 
eliminated, and the bono is a natural ally of a plan of financial stabilisation reestablishing the fiscal balance. 
Domato, and in a greater measure Ortega, Bussi and Miranda, and in another way José Alperovich as a minister 
of economy, have used the bono as a inexhaustible resource to financing their unbalances » (Cirnigliaro, 2004, p. 
124). 
47
 See « ‘No habra canje de bonos ni pago de sueldos a estatales’. ‘Por hora’, dijo el ministro Cortés. Cheques sin 
clearing », La Gaceta, San Miguel de Tucuman, 6/02/1988. 
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monetary regimes as much constrasted as those of the Austral, the dollarized and the 
nationalized Pesos.   
In order to follow the evolution of the monetization regime of the Bocade that the figures 7 
and 8 above display, it is coherent with our previous distinction between different waves of 
issuances of provincial monies at the national scale to divide Bocade’s life into three periods 
– the Austral, dollarized Peso and nationalized Peso periods - and several sub-
periods comprising moments of « small » crises in the first and the second periods. The third 
period is one of large crisis ending with the final redemption of the Bocade and its extinction. 
 
3.3.1. The austral Bocade (1985 - 1991) 
The « Austral period » spreads from 1985 to 1991. At the time Bocades were denominated 
in Austral standard, the new money (unit of account and means of payments) that has been 
created in june 1985 by the « Austral plan » which intended to master high inflation inherited 
from the military dictatorship (see figure 12). 
From August 1985 till june 1987, the Bocade successfully implemented and managed by 
the minister R. Cirnigliaro who, with a moderate issuance and benefiting of relatively not too 
bad national economic circonstances48, obtained its good acceptation and habituation by the 
population as well as the support of the local business class. Then, as the national 
macroeconomy was again deteriorating, and the national monetary policy was aiming to 
reduce the money supply of effective Austral in order to limit inflation49, money and credit 
shortages led first at the end of 1987 to the overissuing of Bocades, and then at the start of 
1988 to a crisis of their convertibility.  
Clearly the examination of the agenda of emissions drives to consider that the crisis was 
initiated by bonds’ issuances due to the minister who replaced Cirnigliaro, issuances that 
overcame greatly the amount necessary to compensate inflation. José Domato, the new 
governor elected in December 1987, inherited of the problem. In the first months of 1988, 
with fiscal revenues and federal transfers reduced by the recession (-3%), the government 
could not ensure the convertibility of Bocades representing now quite a large part of the 
money in circulation. In fact this provincial crisis originated in the tightening of an already 
restrictive national monetary policy whose purpose was to contain (unsuccessfully) an 
accelerating high inflation ; the convertibility of the Bocade was threatened by the quasi total 
closure of the discount window of the Provincial Bank at the Central Bank. Worse, the 
                                               
48
 Due to favorable primary effects of the Austral Plan, see figure 12 and table 2. 
49
 The federal government, through the Plan Primavera, was trying to tackle a renewed climbing inflation that 
would end in an hyperinflation in 1989. 
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Provincial Bank was simultaneously excluded by the Central Bank from clearing (La Gaceta, 
6/02/1988).  
More precisely, this crisis of credibility of the Bocade linked to its loss of convertibility 
started on the 23rd of september when Manuel Apaza, the minister of finance of the Riera 
Government at the moment, suspended the redemption of Bocades in what was the usual 
period for that operation. Thus the crisis was the result of an overissuing in a context of 
growing stagflation (see table 3 and figure 13) and restrictions in the federal monetary 
policy50.  
 
Figure 12: Consumer Price Index (yearly average of monthly indexes, base 100 in 
1999) in the Aglomerado Gran San Miguel de Tucuman and in Gran Buenos Aires 
(1981-2003)  
Sources: INDEC and  Serie Histórica del Indice de Precios al Consumidor del Aglomerado Gran Tucumán, 
Direccion de estadistica de Tucuman, Gobierno de Tucuman (consulted 26/01/2012) 
http://estadistica.tucuman.gov.ar/precios_consumidor.htm 
 
Unable to rediscount its credits, the Provincial Bank, operating as a currency board for the 
provincal treasury, was lacking of liquidity in « effective Austral ». Consequently the 
institutional device ensuring the convertibility of the Bocade was momentarily interrupted, 
and credibility and confidence in the bono were at stake. The rate of discount for changing 
Bocade into Austral (efectivo) increased strongly51. Nevertheless this crisis did not drive to 
                                               
50
 Thus it was not a pure example of imported crisis. Therefore the evaluation of the period by Cerro we 
mentioned above may be reconciled with that of Cirnigliaro if we take into account that the latter forgets to 
speak of the policy of his colleague Apaza who succeeded to him in the Riera Government : from july to 
november 1987 Apaza made five new emissions that cannot be considered as simple ajustments to inflation and 
replacement of bonos to be put out of circulation. 
51
 « El titulo de la Camara de Artefactos del Hogar, Eduardo El Eter, advirtio que el gobierno debe respetar los 
plazos pactados originalmente para el canje de bonos, ya que en caso contrario se deteriora la credibilidad de 
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the end of the experience since on one side, the holding in circulation of Bocades was 
facilitated by a massive substitution of notes of 50 Australes by small notes of 1 and 5 
Australes52, and on the other side, a new structural device for the management of the 
convertibility was implemented at the initiative of the Federacion Economica Tucuman 
(FET), the main business organisation of the province. From the 17th of February 1988 on, 
the convertibility of the Bocade was managed in the new frame of the so-called « Operatoria – 
FET », also named « Operatoria confianza » by the minister of finance at the time.  
 
Table 2: Issuances and redemptions of Bocades under Austral standard 
 
This reform of the convertibility regime was negociated between the government, the 
business class, the Provincial Bank and the regional leadership of the CGT (the peronist Trade 
Union)53. It consisted of the following. Bocades’ holders, henceforth, were permitted to 
deposit at any moment their Bocades in special accounts at the Provincial Bank. As soon as 
they were deposited, these bonos were usable at once by the treasury, meanwhile holders had 
                                                                                                                                               
estos medios de pago. Reconecio que el 80% de las operaciones en ese rubro se mueven con bonos y que la 
momentanea suspension de su rescate obliga al comercio a recurrir a la plaza financiera con un costo mensual 
del orden de 20% », in « Por la saturacion con bonos. ‘Shock’ financiero en Tucuman », La Tarde, 30/10/1987.  
52
 « (…) se lanzaran al mercado 17 millones de australes en bonos ‘chico’ de uno y cinco australes, para el retiro 
de los bonos de A 50, los cuales ademas tendran conversion diaria para facilitar su circulacion », in Absorberan 
los de A 50. Canje  diario de bonos,  La Tarde, 5/10/1987. 
53
 See « La convertibilidad de bonos de ahora en mas. Explicaran hoy el gobernador y la FET. El cronograma de 
pago », La Gaceta, 17/02/1988. See also concerning the emergence of the « Operatoria-FET » : « Propuesta de 
la FET a Cortés. Prevé un sistema de acreditacion diaria de bonos de cancelacion de deuda », La Gaceta, 
9/02/1988 ; «  ‘Operatoria Unica’. Desde mañana, nuevo sistema de convertibilidad », La Tarde, 
17/02/1988 ; « Empresarios aceptan un plan de convertibilidad de bonos. Se realizo anoche una asamblea en la 
Federacion Economica », La Gaceta, 17/02/1988 ; « Podran depositar mas bonos hasta un 20% de lo acumulado. 
Los empresarios adheridos a la operatoria FET.Un decreto », La Gaceta, 3/03/1988. 
Year and Governor Month Issuance Decree Amount issued or redeemed Nominal stock of bonds
Fernando Riera  1983 december Austral
1985 August 1 st issue 1.2827/3 10 000 000 10 000 000
november 2 nd issue 2.3885/3 188 000 10 188 000
1986 june 3 rd issue 1126/3 721 000 10 909 000
november 4 th issue 2808/3 3 500 000 14 409 000
1987 january 5 th issue 98/3 1 975 000 16 384 000
march 3 500 000 19 884 000
april 6 th issue 766/3 800 000 20 684 000
may   1 100 000 21 784 000
july 7, 8 and 9 th issues1148-1733-1885/3 43 000 000 64 784 000
august 10 and 11 th  issue2404/3 et 2944/3 27 000 000 91 784 000
november 12 th issue 475/3 50 000 000 141 784 000
José Domato december Destruction -21 784 000 120 000 000
1988 march Destruction -5 400 000 114 600 000
october Destruction -1 200 000 113 400 000
december 13 th issue 307/3 ou 2779/3 50 000 000 163 400 000
1989 march 14 th issue 504/3 100 000 000 263 400 000
april 15 th issue 850/3 76 100 000 339 500 000
may 16 & 17 th issue 1111/3  1349/3 170 000 000 509 500 000
september 18 th issue 1989/3 1 000 000 000 1 509 500 000
october Destruction -7 700 000 1 501 800 000
november 19 th issue 2704/3 1 000 000 000 2 501 800 000
1990 february 20 th issue 505/3 5 000 000 000 7 501 800 000
may 21 th issue 1135/3 10 000 000 000 17 501 800 000
july 22 th issue 1562/3 10 000 000 000 27 501 800 000
september 23 rd  issue 1951/3 10 000 000 000 37 501 800 000
october 24 th issue 2101/3 10 000 000 000 47 501 800 000
november 25 th issue 2781/3 50 000 000 000 97 501 800 000
Julio Araoz interventor december 97 501 800 000
1991 january 26 ème émission 24/3 100 000 000 000 197 501 800 000
Ramon Ortega december 197 501 800 000
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to wait five working days before the treasury begins to daily redeem them in effective Austral 
in the limit of 5% per working day untill 100% of the amount initially deposited. These 
Australes were credited on checking or deposit accounts either at the Provincial Bank, or at 
the Popular Savings Bank.  
 
Figure 13: Deflated stock and amount in circulation of Bocades issued between 1985 
and 1991 (in 2003 pesos) 
 
Source : author’s database 
 
Figure 14: Nominal stock of Bocades issued between 1985 and 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inasmuch, the crisis was not immediatly resolved and lasted probably two months more 
since soon after the institutionalisation of the Operatoria FET, the government restrained the 
scope of the device to 20% of the total amount of bonds issued. But time passing, and the 
hyperinflation exploding and diminishing rapidly the value of the stock of bonds (figure 13), 
the « Operatoria FET » became the new central institutional device for ensuring the 
convertibility of the Bocade untill 2003 (with some modifications in 1995, 2001 and 2002).  
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Therefore, thanks to the support of the local business class and the negociated adjustment 
of the local convertibility regime (operatoria FET), the convertibility crisis of 1987-1988 did 
not degenerate in a terminal crisis of the bond itself. To the contrary the Bocade appeared 
henceforth as a successful monetary institution with a capacity to reduce the consequences of 
national monetary turbulences at the local level. It was a local innovation which was able to 
transform a large national crisis into a small provincial crisis. This capacity was confirmed in 
the following years when the Province was hit by new great crises or big changes at the 
national level such as the replacement of the austral by the dollarized Peso in 1991-1992, the 
Tequila effect crisis in 1995-1996, the currency board crisis started in 1999, and the 
« pesification » of the national money in 2002. For example when the national plan of 
convertibility of July 1991 ended the hyperinflation, the Bocade went on its way as a tax 
backed money convertible in the new Peso standard, a proof that it was supported, protected, 
and finally guaranteed as an effective and efficient economic instrument by the provincal 
business class (sometimes in opposition with the provincial government itself). 
Indeed with the institution of the new regime of convertibility of the Operatoria-FET, a 
new period of the Austral Bocade opened up which lasted untill the end of 1991. This second 
subperiod was one of quick and massive devaluation of the stock of Bocades in circulation 
(figure 13), for what can be called the second Austral Plan, the Primavera Plan, was not able 
to stop the dynamics of hyper-stagflation (hyperinflation combined with a strong recession 
which reinforced it) that developped at that time. From the end of 1988 on, new massive 
issuances of Bocades, in order to maintain the purchasing power of the total of bonos in 
circulation, were made (see figure 14 and table 2). But until inflation lowered at the end of 
1990 (figure 12 and table 3), these emissions only reduced the speed of depreciation of the 
stock. In 1991, inflation was contained, and a strong recovery occured (table 3) with an 
appreciation of the stock of bonos (in the first term of 1991 the purchasing power of this stock 
comes back to the value of its first issuance in August 1985). Then we observe a new slower 
depreciation till November 1991 (very similar to the initial one at the end of 1985), date of the 
forecasted redemption of the whole stock of bonds and its replacement by new ones 
denominated in dollarized Peso.  
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Table 3: Growth and inflation between 1981 and 2006 in Argentina and Tucuman 
 
3.3.2. The dollarized Peso Bocade (1992-2001) (still under construction) 
As already mentionned, Bocade did not disappear with the change from Austral to a new 
dollarized Peso at the federal level. First the ultimate date for the redemption of the remaining 
Austral Bocades was extended until the end of November 1993 (see figure 11). Then new 
emissions were made of Bocades denominated in Peso, one Peso being equivalent to 10 000 
Australes and immediatly convertible at par with one US Dollar.  Thus a new stage in the life 
of Bocades, that we call the « dollarized Peso period », was opened and lasted from January 
1992 to January 2002. 
When the Austral was destroyed by the hyperinflationist process, the Bocade tightly linked 
to it could have also disappeared, all the more so since the circulating Bocades were to lost 
their legal value at the end of November 1991. But Governor Domato, contested inside its 
political Party - the peronist Justicialist Party, was replaced in January 1991 for the last year 
of his mandate by a federal « interventor » who declared that the Bocade should carry on54. 
Therefore, the convertibility plan and the dollarization of the peso did not kill the Tucuman 
                                               
54
 It can be explained by the fact that Julio Araoz, this interventor was a peronist from the Province of Cordoba 
who was a quite close political friend of Carlos Menem, the new peronist president elected in 1989 (La Gaceta, 
24 de Junio de 2012, Tucumán). Menem who was originary from the Province of La Rioja was accustomed to 
the issuance of Bocades, and La Rioja carried on issuing them in 1992 as well (see above, section 2). 
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Bocade as it seems to have been the case for the Bocade of Salta. A rebirth’s Act55, prepared 
by the federal interventor, was voted by the legislative power of the Province in October 
1991 ; it authorized the issue of Bocades in the new national money which was to be put into 
circulation at the start of 1992. This Act allowed for new issuances of the bonds, without 
changing their forms and the modalities of their conversion in peso, considering that : 
« the Bonos de Cancelacion de Deudas are presently well accepted on the market place. (…) this acceptance 
is based on the system of convertibility set up by the Government of the Province by means of  the operations of 
deposit and change, through the Provincial Bank. (…). (…) inasmuch it results admissible to allow the Executive 
Power to take the necessary measures for adapting the circulation of the Bonos de Cancelacion de Deudas, to the 
new conditions established at the national level, when the change in the monetary unit will be implemented »56. 
 
Figure 15: The ultimate date of change of the Austral Bocade in Peso Bocade 
 
 
As displayed by figures 16 and 17, the monetary regime of this new Bocade must be 
divided into four sub-periods that do not fit exactly with the timing of the three successive 
administrations of Governors Ortega, Bussi and Miranda57.  
1. The first sub-period was one of transition and conversion from the Austral to the Peso 
Bocade, with few new issuances. It lasted till the Tequila Effect financial crisis at the end of 
1994 under Ortega government.  
 
2. This crisis (recession and banking crisis in 199558) was the first challenge to the 
dollarized Peso regime. The Tucuman government reacted to the monetary shortage by 
                                               
55
 The Act n°6299 which modifies the article 2 of the Act 5728 of the 24/07/1985 modified by the Act n°5866 of 
the 23/07/1987 concerning the Bills of Redemption of Debts. 
56
 Honorable legislatura de Tucuman, Ley N° : 6.299 promulgada el 23-10-1991, publicada el 08-11-1991, 
http:/www.hlt.gov.ar/digest_textoley.php ?selley=6299. 
57
 Ramon Ortega is the governor elected in December 1991 and taking his office in January 1992. Antonio Bussi 
is the governor elected in December 1995, and Julio Miranda the following governor coming into office in 
January 2000. Bussi, a military, was the only one of the three who was not a peronist but a politician from the 
extreme right. He had been already at the head of the Tucuman government as a non elected governor at the 
beginning of the military « Processo » dictatorship (1976 - 1977).  
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increasing strongly the amount of Bocades in circulation (to be redeemed in 1999), thus 
avoiding recession (provincial GDP grew by 2.5% in 1995, meanwhile national GDP knew a 
decrease of -2.8%, and for the 1995 and 1996, total growth rates are 2.7% and 3.5% for 
Argentina and Tucuman respectively, see table 3).  
Figure 16: Net stock of Bocades issued between 1992 and 2003  
 
Figure 17: Deflated net stock of Bocades issued between 1992 and 2003   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interestingly in this Tequila sub-period (from January 1995 to December 1996), the 
massive increase in the stock of bonos from 30 to 80 millions of pesos (table 4) did not 
threatened the credibility of the bonos and their convertibility at par into effective Pesos. The 
financial and economic crisis was federal more than provincial, and the Bocade did not suffer 
any discount vis-à-vis the Peso, as the North-American economist, Arnold Harberger, who 
                                                                                                                                               
58
 The Tequila financial crisis has been at the origin of a generalized privatization of provincial public banks 
(Clarke and Cull, 1999). It has been the case for Banco Provincial de Tucuman, privatized in May 1996 and 
becoming Banco del Tucuman S.A., but still acting as the exclusive financial agent for the provincial treasury. 
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was observing on the spot and modelizing the economy of the Province at the moment, 
testified in December 1996: 
« Perhaps the specific question which may be made concerning Tucuman is about the existence of a 
provincial money supply under the form of bonos, that circulate as if they are real money and are 
generally accepted at par within the province (though they are sold with discount outside). I think that if 
they are not plentiful, they don’t have any special effect. A quick test of their affluence would be their sale 
with a significant discount in Tucuman itself. Surely it should occur if the provincial Government would 
flood the market with such bonos, issuing them in a greater amount than the total of cash in Peso that 
Tucuman wants to maintain in normal circonstances. (…) But we do not observe any significant discount 
on the local market place. (…) They are effectively accepted at par, mainly because they can be used to 
settle on liabilities such as provincial taxes. That is when the supply of bono becomes very large relatively to 
the extent of its underlying « guaranteed use » (payment of taxes, etc.), that local discount is likely to appear »  
(Harberger, 1996, p. 154). 
 
Table 4: Issuances and redemptions of Bocades under the dollarized Peso standard 
Year and Governor Month Issuance Decree Amounts issued or redeemed Nominal stock of bonds 
1991 january 26 th issuance 24/3 Australes : 100 millions 197 501 800 000 
Ramon Ortega december       197 501 800 000 
1992       1 Peso = 10 000 Australes 19 750 180 
1993   27 th issuance 1274/3 20 256 000 20 256 000 
1994   28 th issuance 3522/3 10 000 000 30 256 000 
1995 february 29 th issuance 1176/3 20 000 000 50 256 000 
  april 30 th issuance 2295/3 30 000 000 80 256 000 
Antonio Bussi december       80 256 000 
1996 july 31 th issuance 948/3 15 000 000 95 256 000 
 1997 april Destruction   -50 000 000 45 256 000 
1998        45 256 000 
1999 sept. Oct. 32 th issuance 20/3 30 000 000 45 256 000 
  
  33 th issue 266/3 15 000 000   
  
  Destruction 212/3 -45 000 000 45 256 000 
  november 34 th issuance 1918/3 10 000 000 55 000 000 
Julio Miranda december       55 000 000 
2000 february 35 th issue 2767/3 30 000 000 85 000 000 
  may 36 th issue 750/3 12 000 000 97 000 000 
 2001 january 37 th issue 7/3 12 000 000 109 000 000 
 
april 38 th issue 1091/3 400 000 109 400 000 
  november Destruction   - 400 000 109 000 000 
  december Destruction   -11 000 000 98 000 000 
 
Figure18 displays also that Bocades were well accepted on the local markets during these 
years59. 
 
 
 
Figure 18: The general acceptance of the Bocade in the Public in July 1995. 
                                               
59
 See also « Los bonos ‘viejos’ caducan en 1999 », La Gaceta, November 24th, 1995: « Segun informo a la 
Gaceta, el encargado de la seccion cambio de bonos del Banco de Tucuman, (…), “No hay ningun problema con 
la circulacion de esos billetes, porque el banco realiza su rescate normalmente, de acuerdo a la ley“, indico el 
bancario ». 
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Source : Ricardo Heredia. La Gaceta, July 27th, 1995 
 
A newspaper’s article published in November 1995 nonetheless draws attention to the 
discount rates when changing Bocades against Pesos, suggesting that they were quite high 
due to a monetary anarchy60. But in fact, as shown in the following quotation from this article, 
it is a description of the various possible ways and costs to do such a conversion, showing that 
this « anarchy » was indeed quite organized and not so much costly: 
« « Arbolitos » in the « City ». In the change of assets, the holders can lose between 1 and 10 per cent. (…) 
The situation became complicated in the last months as a result of doubts about the acceptation of the bono for 
determinated payments. Then like a magical alternative, a new banking business appears, and the « arbolitos » 
(street moneychangers) reappear in the « City » as in times of hyperinflation (…). (…) Banco Nacion and 
branches of national private banks do not use our outlandish means of payment. The Banco Empresario de 
Tucuman implemented the immediate exchange in peso with a commission of 3%. Moreover there is an 
exchange window opened to the public as well as in the Velox Bank, the Municipal Bank than in the ex Banco de 
la Provincia de Tucuman (BPT). In the Velox and the Empresario Banks, have been created custodian accounts 
for deposits in bonos, as other paid services. Entrepreneurs who own a current account in the Bank of 
Tucuman use both operative processes of this entity. One is known as ‘Mix’. For this deposit, on 50% in 
bonos is accepted. In 72 hours, the amount is credited in effective (peso), with a rebate of 1% for interest. 
The other device is called  « FET » (demanded by this business association) and the same interest is due. 
In this case deposits are 100% in bonos and are credited in peso at the rate of 20% daily from the fifth 
day. The Bank of Tucuman redeems also the bonos of other banks, but with a commission of 2%  on the 
total amount. Despite all that, it happened that the official Bank was not able to fulfil its commitment facing a 
shortage of legal tender notes at the Treasury. ‘Nor the clients were allowed to take back the bonos they have 
deposited », said a bank employee ascribing this situation to the necessity for the State to pay for belated 
wages ». 
 
This quotation nevertheless shows also that the convertibility of the Bocade was a 
permanent constraint on the credibility of the Provincial Government, even if the bono was 
well received on the local market place. Generalized lack of Pesos was propicious to the 
apparition of local financial speculators taking advantage of the change in the relative 
disposable amounts of Pesos and Bocades. But as the shortage of Pesos in the provincial 
Treasury’s coffer in 1995 could be attributed to the deep financial crisis that the national 
                                               
60
 « Hay 80 millones de bonos en danza. La plaza tucumana se complica por la proliferacion de esta moneda al 
que cuesta cambiar », La Gaceta, november 12 th, 1995, p. 18. 
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currency board regime was suffering this year, it seems that the Tucuman Government was 
able to avoid the blame, when not able to assure bocades’ conversion in time, and to muddle 
through once more.  
 
Figure 19 : Endebtment of the Tucuman Province by Governor Bussi from 1997 to 
1999 
 
Source : Yanez et alii (2000) 
 
3. Bussi’s government, during its first year of administration (1996), followed on the path 
of Ortega, but to the contrary in January 1997, after the recovery from the crisis, he started  a 
program aiming to take out of circulation and redeem the whole stock of Bocades (Salvador, 
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1997). Hence this third sub-period is that of the first political crisis of the Bocade, a 
questioning of its existence aiming at its replacement by a massive appeal to much more 
costly public debt (see Figure 19 above)61. As shown in Table 4, 50 millions of Bocades, 
nearly half the total stock, were withdrawn from circulation and destroyed in april 1997. But 
an accelerating and costly provincial public debt took place, and the attempt fell short in 
1999.  
In 1999, the Asian, Russian and Brasilian financial crises occured, and a fly to quality 
affected the international movements of capital, depriving Latin American countries of 
external financing. Due to the full dependance of its monetary base on foreign entries of 
capital under the currency board regime, Argentina fell into a deep and four years long 
recession. Bussi, who had develop indebtment on the international financial markets, was no 
more able to find new credit, and had to return to issuances of Bocades : he issued 45 millions 
of new bonos to redeem those whose redemption was falling due, and added a net emission of 
10 millions before leaving the power to his successor.  
 
4. The first two years of the Miranda’s government compose, with the last year of Bussi’s 
administration the fourth sub-period of life of the dollarized Bocade. As recession deepened, 
provoking the defeat of the Justicialist Party at the presidential election of 1999, the new 
provincial government, an alliance between Peronists and Radicals (UCR) (José Alperovitch, 
then member of the UCR, was the minister of Economy), carried on enlarging the quantity of 
circulating Bocades : 42 millions in 2000, and 12 more millions at the beginning of 2001, 
putting the total stock up to 109 millions (table 4). But as the discount rate of the Bocade on 
the market was starting to climb above 4% in October, reaching 7% in December (figure 20), 
11 millions were withdrawn this month, meanwhile one of the largest monetary, economic, 
financial, political and social crisis that Argentina has ever known was bursting out. At the 
outset of 2002, this crisis entailed a radical change in the national monetary regime with the 
fall of the currency board, and a return to a nationalized peso under the name of 
« pesification ». 
Again, as during the Tequila crisis, enlarging the Bocades’ stock and circulation appeared 
successful for countering the credit crunch and lessen the provoked recession (see table 3) : 
during the four years of the recession, between 1999 and 2002, the cumulated fall of GDP 
was -19.5% for the whole Argentina, meanwhile it was only -13.5% for Tucuman ; if we take 
                                               
61
 See Yañez y otros, 2000, pp. 17 & sg. : « De las cifras se concluye que durante los gobiernos de R.B. Ortega y 
A.D. Bussi, se aumento el endeudamiento anual (promedio) en 120% y 520% con respecto al gobierno de J.C. 
Araoz. Si comparamos los dos ultimos periodos de gobierno, el endeudamiento anual (promedio) practicamente 
se triplico » (p. 18). 
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only the last three years 1999-2001 of the dollarized Peso, we obtain respectively -8.6% and -
2.5% for Argentina and Tucuman (-5.2% and +1.3% for 2000-2001, the Miranda’s 
government first two years)62.  
Here we still have to describe measures taken during the crisis to maintain the 
convertibility : Plazo fijo y cheques differidos, july 2001. Instauration of a unified circuit of 
the Treasury (Cuenta unica del sector publico a la Tesoreria general en el Banco del 
Tucuman SA) : money received in pesos, and partial or total payments made in Bocades, 
since Pesos were reserved prioritarily for the conversion of Bocades at par by Operatoria 
FEP. Operatoria paralela in december 2001. See La Gaceta July  24th et 29th, 2001. See also 
Beckmann.  
 
3.3.3. The Nationalized Peso Bocade (2002-2003) (under construction) 
2002 was a year of very deep crisis for Argentina with a fall of the national GNP of about 
minus 11% and an inflation of the CPI of 41% (dec/dec)  (table 3), with large social unrests, 
political instability, and a great redistribution of wealth due to the monetary crisis and the 
asymetric modalities of the « pesification » of debts. In Tucuman, the crisis was also strong 
and multidimensional (minus 8% for the GGP and 49.4% (dec/dec) for inflation). And, in 
contrast with the hyperinflation crisis in 1989-1991, it went with a crisis of confidence and 
credibility in the Bocade, whose rate of discount on the market vis-à-vis the Peso, as shown in 
figure 20, reached nearly 14%, surely a rate never observed before. 
 
Table 5: Issuances and redemptions of Bocades under the nationalized Peso standard 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Discount rate of Bocades between 1999 and 2003 
                                               
62
 As shown also in table 3, price deflation was stronger in Tucuman than in the whole Argentina in the years 
1999-2001 (-4.1% or -4.3% compared to -4.0% or 2.0%), and in 2002, after the « pesification » (nationalization), 
inflation was stronger (49.4% versus 41% or 31.4% versus 25.9%). On the four years of recession, prices in 
Tucuman increased by 45% and in Argentina by 37% (december t/december t-1), or, using arithmetic average of 
monthly indexes, 27% instead of 23%. 
 52
 
Sources: Cerro (2002), BCRA (2003) 
 
But with recession, monetary uncertainty concerning the federal system and unit of 
account, and the shortage of national legal tender money becoming deeper, the only way for 
the Province not to collapse and going into bankruptcy was to issue more bonos, while 
implementing measures to maintain cuasi-convertibility and limit an unavoidable crisis of 
credibility. 
 
Figure 21: Amount and discount rate of Bocades (January 2000 and May 2003)63 
 
Source : Cerro, 2002, p. 19. 
  
 
                                               
63
 The first significant increase of the stock of bocades from december 2000 and january 2001 is not reflected in 
the rate of discount before april (slightly) and november (more strongly) 2001 ; but the second increase in 
december 2001 seems to have an immediate and cumulative effect on the discount rate ; the third increase in 
march 2002 is paralleled one month later by a similar increase of the rate of discount which carries on despite no 
more emission is made and untill specific measures are taken to lower it (see figure 14).  
 53
Develop on measures taken to improve the confidence in the Bocade in 2002: After the 
extension of the waiting time of conversion of Bocades in Peso at Operatoria FET (60 days 
since 2001, 56 days in january 2002), this delay has been lowered to 35 days in june 2002. 
(Beckmann, 2002 in Boletin Numismatico de Tucuman n° 3, julio 2002).  
Scandal about bills of 20 pesos made by Cicone instead of Casa de la moneda. Double 
issuing of the same bills. 
Cite Elias : bonos in circulation must not represent more than 30% of the monetary basis 
if credibility is to be maintained ; But  they would have reached 70%. 
 
4. Was the Bocade successful?  
 
Usually economists use two indicators (both « prices » of money) to evaluate the quality 
of a monetary policy in developping countries suffering from the original sin of not to be 
able to have a strong currency. These indicators are: 1/the exchange rate of the local money 
into an outside currency considered as a major and stable standard of value ; 2/ the 
purchasing power of the local money measured by a consumer price index. In the case of 
regional moneys, that is also what has been used for instance by Farley Grubb in his studies 
of the monetary experiments in currency finance in the British colonies who became the 
United States of America. But this view is partial as soon as one does not consider that 
money is neutral, and that different monetary regimes have different impacts on growth 
regime and indebtment regime. As we have seen in section 2, complementary local fiscal 
monies are issued especially with the purpose to stimulate the local economy and to reduce 
the public debt. Therefore concerning the complementary tucumani money and the 
evaluation of its viability and efficiency, we must confront four questions. First, was the 
local monetary regime of convertibility viable in the long run, that is was convertibility at 
par of the Bocade in Austral and Peso maintained? Second, was the Bocade inflationist, 
that is had it an impact on the local price level which added a local inflation to the national 
one? Three, had it a positive impact on the provincial economy, that is do we observe that 
the growth of the Tucuman GPP (Gross Provincial Product) has been improved during the 
years of emission of the Bocade? Four,  did it reduce the provincial public debt with private 
banks, financial markets, and the federal government? 
Unfortunately it is very difficult, not saying impossible, to answer such questions in a 
truely scientific way for three principal reasons. Firstly provincial data are scarce, and when 
disposable most often they are not completely reliable. Secondly it is impossible to use a 
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contrefactual methodology to evaluate what would be the specific impact of the Bocade 
either on inflation or growth. Thirdly many variables, exogenous and endogenous, other 
than the presence or not of a complementary fiscal money, are playing a role in the 
evolution of the quantitative indicators and indexes that we need in order to answer the four 
questions above in a reliable and trustworthy way. Thus several other studies on different 
provincial economies having implemented or not a local fiscal money that would allow to 
develop a comparative approach should be necessary for this.  Historians are well aware of 
these difficulties. 
Therefore the following evaluation must only be seen as a first attempt to muddle 
through with the existing data by relying also on more qualitative observations and 
« parameters ».64  In the preceeding section of this paper, we have already noted that the 
Bocade had been a successful device since it had been viable in the long run and had been 
supported by the provincial market place. We have noticed also that at the time of monetary 
crises affecting the federal unit of account and legal tender, it had been mobilized 
efficiently as a shock absorber, allowing the province to grow at a rate higher than the 
national rate. Also the provincial monetary regime was able to change through institutional 
innovations maintening the convertibility of the Bocade and therefore its character of 
complementary money to the federal legal tender and unit of account. We now try to go a 
little further in the answers to our four questions above from the disposable macroeconomic 
data concerning the Province. 
                                               
64
 Gatch (2011) in his study of the tax anticipation scrips issued by a significant number of US  Cities in the 
nineteen thirties enlightens qualitative and institutional conditions and parameters of their success as the 
followings: « the scrip experiences of the depression years suggest four relevant parameters for scrip 
experiments based upon public taxing power:  
· Scrip issuances must be commensurate with the absorptive capacity of retailers, which have obligations outside 
the local economy denominated in national money.  
· Scrip issuances must be commensurate with the absorptive capacity of local governments, which have debt and 
other payment burdens outside the local economy denominated in national money.  
· Tax obligations must be sufficiently large to create a demand for scrip for use in tax payments to local 
governments.  
· Mechanisms must exist to redistribute scrip from those who have it to those who need it for tax payments 
(“avoiding the clogging of channels”).  
These parameters represent necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for successful tax-based scrip to the extent 
that community willingness to use scrip outside of the circuit of tax payments is an indispensible, albeit residual, 
condition for a viable tax-based scrip. In the American experience with such scrip during the 1930s, it remains 
unclear (beyond anecdotal evidence) to what extent scrip actually circulated via transactions unrelated to the 
original tax circuit. Beyond the sheer presence or absence of a discount on standard funds, the broader 
acceptance of scrip for routine transactions represents a more significance measure of scrip’s success qua local 
currency. At the very least, scrip’s suitability as a generalized medium of local exchange would exhibit network 
effects--the more varied its transactional use, the more useful it would become for further transactions—subject 
to some minimum threshold below which scrip would be shunned as a nuisance, and a maximum threshold 
above which scrip would lose its transactional validity (i.e invalid outside of the prevailing tax jurisdiction, and 
the economic area to which the jurisdiction is relevant). The determination of these lower and upper thresholds 
would depend upon the specific articulations of the four parameters set out above; ultimately, however, what 
activates tax-based scrip is sufficient public willingness to accept scrip as a legitimate economic instrument ». 
(Gatch, 2011, pp. 22-23). 
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4.1. The convertibility at stake : was the exchange rate at par of the bocade against 
the austral and peso maintained? 
  
The rate of exchange (or discount) of the Bocade vis-à-vis the legal tender surely is a good 
indicator of its level of acceptation by the public, and theoretically it is a directly observable 
variable. But in fact, in the case of complementary provincial fiscal monies, we lack, to date, 
of systematic data concerning this exchange rate, especially for the Austral Bocade. 
Nevertheless our general impression drawn from newspaper archives (La Tarde, La Gaceta, 
La Nacion, etc.), interviews and literature, is that the parity of the Bocade with the Austral as 
well as with the dollarized Peso has been effectively maintained in the long run, and it is 
likely what explains its durability.  
It is only shortly in 1988 and 2002 at the core of the convertibility crisis, that the discount 
rate of the Bocade deteriorated and overtook the usual transaction cost, as shown in figures 1, 
20 and 21 above. To sum up the Bocade has known two crises of convertibility in 1987-1988 
and 2001-2003, and in 1997-1999 it has been politically threatened to disappear. On the other 
hand, as we have seen, the Bocade endured the national hyperinflation and was not threatened 
by the « Tequila Effect » crisis in 1995-1996, despite important issuances in these years, and 
some practical problems of conversion in time. 
Also the Bocade has suffered of transaction costs on the market, possibly from 1 to 10% 
for change in the informal market (arbolitos) as reported in newspapers in 1988 and 199565, 
probably more or less 3-4% in the private banking sector, as reported explicitely in the 
dollarized Peso period. But, whatever the level of this cost, it ought not to be taken as an 
indicator of the depreciation of the Bocade vis-à-vis the national all-purpose and all-province 
money66. It was mainly the price of liquidity all credit instruments have to suffer. Thus, in the 
context of growing hyperinflation of the 1987-1989, a rate of discount of 10 % was less that 
the official regulated rate of rediscount at the Central Bank (figure 22).  
 
Figure 22: Interest rates (1985-1991) : 
Rediscount at BCRA and Call of official banks 
                                               
65
 La Tarde 30/10/1987, La Gaceta 6/02/1988 and  footnote 53 above. 
66
 Present shopkeepers everywhere know also these differences of transaction costs when they receive payments 
with different credit or payment cards such as Visa or American Express. 
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Source : Cerro (1988) and BCRA 
 
In fact we have find many quotations confirming that the Bocade was largely accepted and 
trusted by the public, despite the discount rate it could have to support occasionally to change 
it immediatly in Austral or Peso. As long as the Bocade was backed by provincial taxes and 
effective convertibility at par insured without discount and in a reasonnable delay by the 
« Operatoria FET », which has been the case in the long run, Bocade was trusted. Even 
political opponents of the device recognized this fact:   
« De las sensaciones recogidas en la City Tucumana, la lecture es clara : existe confianza en el bono como 
herramienta financiera, pero tambien preocupacion porque el gobierno no mantega el esquema vigente, que 
sostiene su circulacion » (Salvador, 1997). 
 
Thus, given the capacity of the Tucuman governments, sustained by the local business 
community, to restore the bond’s credibility by adapting its process of conversion at par, and 
also to act in order to reduce its rate of  discount on the market, it is possible to assume that 
even the crisis of 2002 was as the crisis of 1988 a small crisis, that is a crisis which was not 
implying the end of the Bocade. The Bocade has not been the victim of this crisis but of 
negociations with the IMF which stressed the necessity to end with provincial monies.67  
 
4.2. What about the purchasing power of the Bocade? Did it add a local inflation?  
 
                                               
67
 « El acuerdo que el ex presidente Eduardo Duhalde (in 2002) firmo con el FMI establecio la obligacion de que 
la Argentina vuelva a tener una sola moneda », Una Historia de Descontroles, Rechazos y Esperanzas, 
anonymous Note of information received during an interview in September 2009 in San Miguel de Tucuman 
with José Alberto Cuneo Vergès, ex minister of Economy of the gobernor Miranda in 2002, and three of his 
collaborators.  
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An exchange rate index is certainly not totally discriminant for judging the internal 
viability and quality of a money, for it says nothing of the productive efficiency of the local 
monetary policy. The evolution of the purchasing power of the money is a better index from 
this point of view. But with provincial monies based on strict convertibility in national 
money, the problem is that inflation or deflation of the local money may be massively 
imported, and thus it is difficult to isolate imported change in the price level from change 
possibly linked to local emissions.  
For Tucuman, we have long range historical monthly series for the local CPI concerning 
the Gran Tucuman (the capital and its agglomeration) that we can compare with an equivalent 
series for the Gran Buenos Aires, which is generally taken as representative of the consumer 
price level of the whole Argentina. Therefore, assuming that both indexes are build on the 
same methodological bases, we can observe differences between the two indexes that would 
eventually display that the Bocade added systematically local over-inflation to the national 
level of prices, as assumed by some economists. The higher cost of transaction due to 
monetary plurality would explain the higher price level in Tucuman compared to the national 
level (Cerro, 2002, p. 19)68. 
In order to look at the empirical evidence we display in Figure 23 the ratio of the two 
consumer price indexes (CPI), base 100 fixed in 1985, the first year of existence of the 
Bocade. And in Figure 24 we show the difference between these two annual growth rates 
(computed in two ways from monthly data). In Figure 23 we observe that inflation rates in 
Tucuman and Buenos Aires are related but differ permanently with long term variations of 
about 15-20% around the 1985 point of reference, and medium range fluctuations of about 
5%. We can also observe that the convertibility Plan had a huge impact on the relative value 
of the two indexes (minus 20%), but it is not possible to consider that the introduction of 
Bocade impacted the local dynamic of the price level either in the long or medium run. 
During the period of existence of the Bocade, we had years when prices in Tucuman were 
climbing faster than prices in BA, but also years when it was the opposite. And we observe 
the same type of fluctuations in periods where there is no complementary provincial money. 
In fact on Figure  24 we can see that the number of years in which the growth rate of prices is 
higher in Tucuman is very similar to the number of years where the opposite is true.  
Therefore, it is not possible to conclude to a specific inflationist effect of the bocade and  
it seems reasonable to assume that imported inflation (or deflation) has been overwhelming 
during Bocade’s life as well as in other periods, thanks to the violence of the national 
                                               
68
 See for instance La Gaceta, october 13th, 2001, « Advierten que Tucuman podria afrontar una hiperinflacion 
en bonos ». 
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monetary regimes of either high inflation, or deflation through quasi-dollarization. Adaptation 
to local situations of the national monetary policy has been probably the essential task of the 
provincial monetary policy when aiming at the resilience of the local monetary regime. But it 
is necessary to consider short term factors as well in Buenos Aires as in Tucuman that could 
explain the fluctuations that are different here and there, considering the Bocade as such a 
factor. But a possible short term impact on inflation should not be considered alone but in 
relation to another possible impact on production growth. 
 
Figure 23: Relative level of Tucuman CPI compared to Buenos Aires CPI 
(both indexes = 100 in 1985) (1968-2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Differences between the annual rates of variation of Consumer Price 
Indexes in Gran San Miguel de Tucuman and in Gran Buenos Aires (INDEC) 
 
Sources : same as figure 12 
 
In Figure 23 the evidence is not only that deflation introduced by the national 
convertibility Plan has been stronger in Tucuman than in Buenos aires, but also that the 
relative price level in Tucuman has increased in the three periods of national crisis -1987-88, 
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1995-96, and 2002-03 – periods in which the stock of Bocades has much increased, too much 
likely for the first and last of them where, as seen above, this increase has gone with a crisis 
of their convertibility. Figure 25 shows that in these three crises, the stock of Bocades reached 
around half the value of the own resources of the provincial State, and about 10% of its total 
spendings.  
 
Figure 25: Stock of Bocades related to provincial own resources and total expenses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Average Yearly growth rates of GNP and CPI by periods: 
Argentina and Tucuman compared (means of yearly growth rates) 
Source : Table 3 
 
But the evidence is also that these short term periods of local overinflation are followed by 
periods of decrease of the relative price index, which means that the existence of Bocades was 
not by nature and structurally inflationist. Moreover the fact that the local answer to the 
Tequila effet crisis was more inflationist than the Buenos Aires reaction to this crisis, but did 
GNP growth rate GPP growth rate CPI Dec(T)/Dec(t-1) CPI Year. M.(t)/Year. M.(t-1)
Argentine Tucuman  Buenos Aires Tucuman  Buenos Aires Tucuman
Peso moneda nacional
1981-1984 -2,00% 0,62% 365,7 376,0 310,0 315,1
Austral 
1985-1991 -0,09% -0,71% 1054,4 1051,6 971,7 903,8
1985-1987 1,00% -0,53% 213,9 203,0 297,9 284,6
1988 -3,0% 0,9% 387,7 391,6 343,0 350,3
1988-1990 -4,85% -7,42% 3133,8 3142,6 2696,8 2488,1
1991 9,1% 10,5% 84,0 75,2 171,7 146,2
Dollarized Peso 1,0
1992-2001 2,80% 2,72% 2,8 3,2 4,2 4,3
1992-2003 2,16% 2,11% 6,0 6,9 6,7 7,5
1992-1994 7,30% 4,33% 9,6 10,8 13,2 13,5
1995-1996 1,35% 1,75% 0,9 2,8 1,8 3,9
1997-1998 6,00% 6,60% 0,5 -0,9 0,7 -0,6
1999-2001 -2,87% -0,83% -1,3 -1,4 -1,1 -1,4
1995-2001 0,9% 2,0% -0,2 0,0 0,3 0,3
Dedollarized Peso
2002-2006 4,96% 5,64% 12,6 16,0 12,4 14,2
2002-2003 -1,05% -0,95% 22,4 25,2 19,7 23,4
2004-2006 8,97% 10,03% 6,1 9,9 7,6 8,2
More inflation and more growth Less inflation and less growth
Less inflation and more growth More inflation and  less growth
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not threatened the confidence, credibility and trust in the local money, points out that inflation 
per se, all the more in periods of deep crisis, is not necessarily a criteria of inefficiency of a 
monetary policy. As Table 6 shows, either with a complementary provincial money (1985-
2003) or not (1980-1984 and 2004-2006), under a threshold, more inflation is also more 
growth not only through time, but also through space.   
 
4.3. Did it improve the provincial economic growth?  
 
Let’s come then to our third question about the productive efficiency of the institution of 
the Bocade. Did it make a difference on GPP? It is in fact quasi impossible to answer this 
question in a scientific way since on one hand, data relative to Tucuman GPP are very 
questionable, and on the other hand, even if they were reliable, it would be difficult to prove, 
other things being equal, that the level of production in Tucuman during the Bocade period 
was higher that it would have been without Bocade. Here a contrefactual or comparative 
method would be required but is out of reach. It supposes that we can have reliable data for 
the whole Bocade period and beyond, which is not the case. Homogenous data relative to the 
GPP simply do not exist because of the lack of provincial statistical institutions in the 
eighties. There are some academic statistical studies displaying data on periods not covered 
by the more recent official statistics provided by the statistical Department of the Provincial 
Government, but they do not necessarily adopt the same definition of GPP ; for some of them, 
an evaluation of the informal economy of the province is included. Thus, in the nonetheless 
proposed figures below and in table 3 above, there is a dissimulated break in the series around 
1993 ; that is why we choose to work exclusively with growth rates. 
In spite of all these limitations, it seems possible to say a few things in relation with what 
we have said about inflation. Figures 26 exhibit not only the volatility of the argentinian 
macroeconomy, but also important annual differences between the GPP growth rate of 
Tucuman and the national GNP. As these differences are either positive or negative, 
differences of growth rates in the medium and the long run are smaller, as shown in Table 6. 
Moreover, between 1981 and 2006 we count 14 positive differences (Tucuman growing faster 
than the national average), 8 negative differences and 4 insignificant. Now during periods 
with Bocade we count 9 positive, 8 negative and 2 insignificant, that is more equilibrated 
oscillations (Table 7).  This could mean that Bocade was a factor of a stronger integration of 
the economy of Tucuman into the national economy, something that Table 6 suggests also 
since it shows that average growth rates in Tucuman and the whole Argentina are very close 
during the Bocade period (all the more in the dollarized peso period) than in other periods 
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where, on average, Tucuman grows faster. Obviously it can be a result not of the presence of 
the Bocade but of differences of economic and political national environment between these 
periods. This observation suggests also that, on average, Bocades were not an incentive to 
growth. 
 
Figures 26: A comparison between Argentinian and Tucumani real growth rates 
 
 
 
Source : Direccion de estadistica de Tucuman (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) ; CFI. 
 
Table 7 : Number of years Tucuman grows faster or less than Argentina as a whole 
Periods Positive difference No difference Negative difference 
1981-2006 14 4 8 
Periods without Bocade : 
1981-1984 
2004-2006 
5 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
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Period with Bocades : 
1985-2003 
 
9 
 
2 
 
8 
Austral Bocade  
1985-1991 
 
4 
 
0 
 
3 
Peso Bocade  
1992-2003 
 
5 
 
2 
 
5 
 
But qualitative data related in section 2 and the strong support that the tucumani business 
class gave to the Bocade imply to push further the reasoning. A new look to Figure 26 
suggests that growth rates in Tucuman were higher when the issuance of Bocades was also 
higher, because stimulated by a context of deep crisis at the national level, and reached 
significant levels as a fraction of public spending and fiscal resources (as shows in Figure 25). 
In these periods the provincial Government was maximizing its capacity to issue a 
complementary money in saturating its constraint of convertibility at par. To the contrary in 
more « normal » years, the constraint of convertibility was working as a straightjacket tight 
all the more so since anticipations of provincial resources backing the money were 
structurally very limited.  
All that suggests that besides the maximum threshold for the volume of bonos in 
circulation beyond which convertibility and trust are threatened, there is also a minimum 
threshold of issuance under which a positive impact of bonos on growth cannot be obtained. 
In the general context of extreme volatility which was caracteristic of Argentine 
macroeconomy in all these years, we can thus assume that the Bocade could be sometimes an 
incentive to growth, sometimes the reverse or neutral. This oscillation was the outcome of the 
weak fiscal autonomy of the Province that gave a disproportionate weight to the constraint of 
convertibility at par of the Bocade in the backing of its credibility. The tucumani treasury 
circuit was too small to allow a permanent impact of the bono on growth. 
 
4.4. Did it reduce the provincial debt? (to follow, under construction) 
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